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INTRODUCTION
Tracing the Lines ofArgument: Foundationalism and Beyond
Is there a reality somewhere out there to be known? If so, how well can I
know it? If not, am I bound for the slippery slope of relativism? These are
baseline metaphysical questions that deserve to be waded through rather than
around. In centuries past, the answer has been a simplistic, "yes there is a
reality, yes I can measure it accurately, and yes, if the proposition of reality is
denied, you enter into the muddled mess of relativism." But it seems the simple
days of naive realism with its Cartesian certainty criterion, are gone. It is quite
difficult for the general populace, never mind professional philosophers and
theologians, to believe that any of us can separate ourselves from our cultural
perspective in order to gain a god's-eye view of the real. We all bring baggage on
the journey of interpretation. One problem for the theologian throughout the
age ofmodernism was that, as they peddled their product from city to city, they
failed to realize just how much interpretative baggage that they indeed carried.
Gradually, this problem was realized, and that realization provoked a response.
In the present day it seems as if the cities ofmodernity have been razed and the
citizens, theologians included, have been exiled to far off Babylon^ to be
culturally assimilated. But, after some time, to the amazement of all, Babylon
releases her modernistic captives. The question is, whether or not to return
home and rebuild on the old foundations.
1 Perhaps it would be fun to imagine tiiis Babylon being located somewhere in France.
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In this thesis I intend to analyze the philosophical claims of critical
realism and their usefulness for Christian theology. In doing so, I believe that
our modernistic captives can find a helpful guide for negotiating the challenges
of doing theology in a postmodern context. In chapter 1, 1 will juxtapose critical
realism and postmodern theology by pointing out their key similarities and
differences. Ultimately, I argue for the adoption of the critical realist framework
and offer five reasons for doing so. In chapter 2, 1 will consider the merits of a
critical realist philosophy of science. One of the more important points I will
attempt to make is that critical realism is compatible with the effort to uphold
the doctrines of classical Christianity as well as take seriously the findings of
mainstream science. Lastly, in chapter 3, 1 will consider hermeneutics from a
critical realist perspective. Therein I will suggest that behind many doctrinal
disputes stands the issue of interpretation; this is an issue that tends to be
overlooked by evangelicals. Also I will give a brief historical overview of literary
theory and its effect on reading the Bible. Lastly, I will specifically consider the
contours of a critical realist hermeneutic. Again, it will be my contention
throughout this thesis that critical realism offers the best philosophical system
for the Christian seeking to articulate his or her faith. Further, I contend that the
Christian, undergirded by a critical realist philosophy, will be positioned to enter
into profitable, irenic dialogue within two important spheres: postmodern
theology and the sciences.^
2 Here 1 consider conversations about hermeneutics to be a part ofwhat would be
discussed when engaging both postmodern Christianity and science. Therefore, my chapter,
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It should be noted that I am writing from an evangelical Christian
standpoint. It should be sufficient for me to explain that I see evangelicalism as
distinct from fundamentalism and postliberalism, but able to incorporate ideas
from both camps. Also, I certainly would erect a large enough tent to include
many, if not all, postmodern theologians. A postmodern philosophical bent
would not cause me to exclude anyone from evangelicalism. With that said, it
seems appropriate for me to comment briefly on the tone I wish to set in this
paper. I believe it is fitting to address this since I will be making critical remarks,
but, as noted, many of these remarks will be directed at ideas held by other
thinkers with whom I share living space under the same evangelical tent. There
are enough stones flying through the air; I do not wish to launch another. I am
not seeking to compose a polemic for critical realism, especially as I engage
postmodern theology. In fact, I have been challenged to think deeply by the
many postmodern authors I have engaged in preparation for writing these
chapters. I find their emphasis on our situatedness within socio-cultural and
linguistic structures to be helpful and timely. Many of their insights are creative
and fresh. I desire to pay homage to the deconstructive notion that none come to
the table of interpretation as objective onlookers. Perhaps an archaeological
tour of Christian thought inspired by Michel Foucault would be enlightening.
Nevertheless, after we step off of that tour bus, I propose we return to reality.
"Critical Realism and Reading the Bible" will be an extension ofwhat is laid out in chapters 1 and
2.
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My hope is that through the dialectic of various contending propositions, the
richness and depth of critical realism will become apparent.
Now, I wish to make one final prolegomenous note. It will be helpful,
before moving ahead, to describe the epistemological undergirding of both the
critical realist and postmodern thinkers. To do this, I will utilize the vocabulary
employed by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen in his. Essays in Postfoundationalist
Theology.^ The terms antifoundationalism, postfoundationalism, and
foundationalism will be used as a broad framework for categorizing varying
epistemic positions. First, foundationalism refers to the notion that all belief can
be justified by an appeal to self-evident or indubitable belief.* These beliefs form
the foundation upon which subsequent beliefmay be built. Implied within
foundationalism is an inflexibility or infallibility of certain types of knowledge.
To the foundationalist, the facts that make up the bedrock of knowledge are
"treated as a privileged class of aristocratic beliefs that serve as the terminating
points in the argumentative chains of justification for our views."^ That is,
foundational beliefs are anchored to the bottom of rational inquiry in a self-
evident or incorrigible manner. Subsequent belief is constructed from that
bottom position of certainty. The foundationalist's advice to our returned
modern exiles would certainly be to rebuild upon the sure foundations of the
past.
3 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1997], 2-5.
4 Ibid., 2.
5 Ibid., 3.
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If foundationalism forms one end of the spectrum, its polar opposite
would be antifoundationalism. The antifoundationalist contends that the
epistemological foundations of knowledge are a fiction. There is no such thing as
foundational knowledge. Rather, an apt metaphor is that knowledge is formed in
a groundless, interrelated web of belief.^ Justification for any belief is found in
the strength of the surrounding and supporting beliefs within the web, which
ultimately are interrelated and interconnected.^ Presumably, an
antifoundationalist notion is common to postmodern theologians and
philosophers alike. However, this statement needs further qualification and will
receive as much in chapter 1. It is sufficient for our introduction to note that the
antifoundationalist would react strongly against modern, generic notions of
rationality while stressing that it is context and community that form the
borders of rational endeavors. In its extreme forms, antifoundationalism
becomes a thorough relativism that undermines the prospect of intercommunal,
intercultural, or interdisciplinary rational dialogue. Ironically, van Huyssteen
points out that at the heart of antifoundationalism is often found a simple
fideism.8 This is ironic because this fideism can actually become a
"foundationalism-in-disguise."9 That is, a set of beliefs containing an individual's
6 Ibid.
^ This is also known as the Coherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification. Coherentism is
a common epistemic position amongst postmoderns.
8 van Huyssteen, 3.
Mbid.
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rationale for faith in God can itself subtly become a foundation for belief. It is
the uncritical commitment to that set of beliefs, inherent in a fideistic stance
towards knowledge that allows for the subtle emergence of a foundation for
belief. Nevertheless, ostensibly, the antifoundationalist would suggest that
foundationalism has met its demise and should be left behind. To our returned
exiles, the antifoundationalist would advise not only to be certain the old
foundations are destroyed but also to creatively imagine a whole new building
project with no foundations at all.
Lastly, occupying the middle ground is the postfoundationalist position.
Postfoundationalism is not coy about acknowledging that one's socio-cultural
context, interpretative experiences, and traditions hold great formative power
over one's epistemic and non-epistemic values.^i Yet, postfoundationalism
points beyond the confines of any singular rational community towards a
possible and plausible intercommunal conversation. Surely, there will be strong
cognitive commitments within one's rational community, but the
postfoundationalist holds that there are enough "...shared resources of human
rationality..." to encourage practitioners to reach beyond the "...walls of [their]
epistemic communities..." in order to grasp the possibility of a "...cross-
contextual, cross-cultural, cross-disciplinary conversation."!^ por the Christian
theologian, there is a certain sense of liberty inherent in a postfoundational
^" Of course, this assertion cuts both ways. The atheist holding to an antifoundationalist
epistemoiogy can unwittingly slip and allow that set of rational beliefs that yield their dis-belief
in any form of theism to become the foundation for their atheism.
" Ibid., 4.
12 Ibid.
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epistemoiogy. This is primarily because a space is cleared once more to ask
ultimate questions about reality. In other words, metaphysical inquiry is once
again legitimated as the nature of reality is seen as the ground upon which
interdisciplinary conversation can take place. Further, critical realism provides
the vocabulary for an articulation of a metaphysical realism that is not simplistic
or trite, but rather takes into account the realities of socially and linguistically
constructed knowledge. Postfoundationalism, then, could be seen as a road with
the ditch of antifoundational relativism to one side and foundational certainty to
the other. Critical realism stands ready to walk this postfoundational road,
maintaining an insistence that there is a reality to be known while at the same
time insisting that knowing it in full is impossible. Now, what advice would the
postfoundationalist give to our returned exiles? It seems that they would advise
a cautious, scrupulous rebuilding project. That is, a project that carefully uses
the old foundations but does not trust them to bear the full weight of the new
superstructure.
With this introductory material I have sought to trace around the edges of
a range of epistemic positions. Next, we will consider critical realism and
postmodern theology. As mentioned above, critical realism is compatible with a
postfoundational epistemoiogy. Is it then appropriate to simply state that all
forms of postmodernism adhere to an antifoundationalist epistemoiogy, thereby
creating a binary pair? It is not surprising to find that this discussion is not that
simple. Nevertheless, the stage is set. There is much to be sorted through; to
that task I now turn.
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CHAPTER 1
Critical Realism and Postmodern Theology
Thus far, we have been made aware of three key epistemological terms:
antifoundationalism, postfoundationalism, and foundationalism.
Foundationalism represents the Enlightenment project and the quest for
certainty of knowledge. Antifoundationalism and postfoundationalism are, to
varying degrees, both critical of the claims of foundationalism. As indicated, the
tenets of critical realism are comfortable with the label of postfoundationalism,
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but how should one categorize the claims of postmodern theology? Should they
be conflated with the radical, antifoundationalist assertions of some postmodern
philosophers who propose the incredulity of all meta-narratives, thus a strict
relativism? I suggest this goes too far; consider two examples. First, Stanley
Hauerwas, who advocates for a constructivist Christian ethic,i3 and is certainly
critical ofmodernism, is also equally critical of antifoundational postmodernism.
In his article The Christian Difference, or Surviving Postmodernism, Hauerwas
quips that there are many who have grouped him with the "...nihilistic,
relativistic, barbarian hordes who threaten all we hold dear�matters such as
objectivity and the family." He goes on to explain that just because
postmodernism levels a strong critique against his primary foe, modernism, it
does not follow that postmodernism becomes uncritically accepted as a
comrade.i'^ In other words, the enemy of his enemy is not necessarily his friend.
A second appropriate example comes in the form of Calvin College
professor of philosophy, james K.A. Smith and his book Who'sAfraid of
Postmodernism^^ as well as his forthcoming Who'sAfraid ofRelativismA^ These
intriguing titles may leave the casual observer wondering just what sorts of
claims are being made. However, immediately, we have in the series preface of
Who's Afraid ofPostmodernism, the conflation of the terms postfoundationalist
" See Stanley Hauerwas, A Community ofCharacter: Toward a Constructive Christian
Social Ethic (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981).
14 Stanley Hauerwas, "The Christian Difference, or Surviving Postmodernism," in Graham
Ward, ed., The BIacl<well Companion to Postmodern Theology (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 145.
15 James K.A. Smith, Who'sAfraid ofPostmodernism?: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and
Foucault to Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).
16 I am aware of this forthcoming book by way of personal communication with Smith. I
assume it will be published with Baker.
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epistemologies and postmodern theory^ Radical claims of the sort that I am
describing as antifoundationalist are most assuredly not being made. I believe,
given the evidence from Hauerwas and Smith, we are in a position to make the
basic claim that postmodern theology does not seek a radical antifoundational
agenda, degenerating into nihilistic relativism. But then, one may ask, is there
any significant difference between the critical realist and the postmodern
theologian? It seems they are both making a postfoundational claim of some
sort.
Sorting this issue out is a large part of what I intend to undertake in this
chapter. I will proceed by first explicating what postmodern theology is
claiming. After that, I will introduce and describe critical realism along with the
concept of emergence. Lastly, I will suggest reasons why critical realism
provides a clearer way forward for the Christian theologian in light of its ability
to engage the sciences, provide a framework for a viable hermeneutic, foster
interdisciplinary dialogue, absorb many of the ideas of postmodern theology,
and retain the paradigm of realism.
Central Tenets of Postmodern Theology
Postmodernism writ large is certainly no monolith, and the same goes for
postmodern theology. There are various schools of thought, developing
specialized, nuanced vocabulary, available for all interested parties. Indeed,
Terrence Tilley, professor of Catholic theology at Fordham University, identifies
17 Smith, Who's Afraid ofPostmodernism, 9.
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ten available postmodern theologies dividing them into four categories:
constructive postmodernisms, postmodern dissolutions, postliberal theology,
and theologies of communal praxis.i^ Further, Wheaton College professor and
systematic theologian Kevin Vanhoozer identifies eight different postmodern
theologies: radical orthodoxy, postliberal theology, postconservative theology,
deconstructive a/theology, reconstructive theology, postmetaphysical theology,
feminist theology, and Anglo-American postmodernity: a theology of communal
praxis.i^ These typologies are sufficient to illustrate that postmodernism is
influential, extant, and varied. For our purposes, I will be tracking broadly with
postmodern theology seeking to highlight core claims rather than delving into
the various schools of thought available.20
As mentioned, postmodern theology (and critical realism) engages in a
sharp critique of foundationalist epistemoiogy. In their book, Beyond
Foundationalism, Stanley Grenz and John Franke describe the demise of
foundationalism as being "the transition from a realist to a constructionist view
of truth and the world. "21 They place an emphasis on noting that language
cannot be purely referential, hence an objective conception of the "real" is
18 Terrence W. Tilley, Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge ofReligious Diversity
(Maiyknoll:Orbis, 1995].
1^ Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed.. The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
20 Another helpful voice for one seeking to survey the landscape of postmodern theology
with an eye toward evangelicalism is Roger E. Olson, Reformed andAlv^ays Reforming: The
PostconservativeApproach to Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007). His
broad categories of conservative Evangelicalism and postconservative Evangelicalism seem to be a
great entry point into the conversation.
21 Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke. Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a
Postmodern Context (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001] 23.
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impossible.22 If language cannot reference the real, then modernistic
explanatory "metanarratives" stand open to critique as well. Grenz and Franke
relay that the "loss of metanarrative" does not mean that narrative has no
function in postmodernity, but rather it is now the "local" narrative that provides
meaning for particular people in particular socio-cultural contexts.23
Above all, however, postmodernism levels a critique of the
epistemological enterprise of foundationalism. Again, the foundationalist
believes that all belief can ultimately be traced back to a self-evident or
incorrigible belief. Those beliefs, then, constitute the sure foundation upon
which all subsequent belief can safely be built. Foundationalism infiltrated
theology in the 19* and 20* centuries by setting up a dualism, characteristic of
modernism, between "left" and "right." That is, the liberal left began to construct
their theology on the sure foundation of incontrovertible religious experience
while the conservative right looked to an error-free Bible for their indubitable
foundation.24 what was the problem with all of this?
Grenz and Franke do not give a direct answer to this question.
Philosopher Alvin Plantinga, however, does. In the chapter from his book
Warranted Christian Belief titled "Justification and the Classical Picture", we find
two fatal objections to foundationalism.^s First, "...foundationalism appears to
be self-referentially incoherent: it lays down a standard for justified belief that it
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 23-24.
25 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 67-107.
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doesn't itself meet."26 in other words, the question to ask is whether or not
foundationalism itself, as an epistemological theory, can be taken to be properly
basic. To attain that status, the theory must be self-evident, incorrigible, or
"Lockeanly evident to the senses."^^ It seems quite obvious that foundationalism
fits none of the criteria for proper basicality. Now, foundationalism could still
become a justified belief based on the evidential basis of other beliefs within an
individual's noetic structure. This means that there would then be good
inductive, deductive, or abductive arguments for foundationalism.^^ From here,
Plantinga simply states that he is unaware of any such arguments.^^ Such
arguments could possibly arise, but their emergence seems improbable. On this
heading, foundationalism is bound to crash. If one were to hold that it is true, it
would seem that they are unjustified in doing so as they would be flouting their
epistemic duty as defined by foundationalism. If one decides to hold that belief
in spite of their epistemic duty as defined by foundationalism, they are again,
clearly, in an inconsistent position.^o
In illustrating the second fatal flaw of foundationalism, Plantinga follows
Thomas Reid and argues that if the foundational picture is accepted, then most of
what people claim to believe is unjustified belief.^i Most people daily accept that
there are other persons existing around them and that they are not a brain in a
vat being manipulated by a mad scientist. They also accept that there is an
26 Ibid., 93.
27 Ibid., 94.
28 Ibid., 95.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 97-99.
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external world beyond their sense experience. Similarly, locations beyond
immediate perception are thought to exist� I cannot see Chicago from Marion,
IN, but I believe it is there, hugging Lake Michigan, covered by a bit of snow at
this moment. People also believe things with regularity based on their memory
of interacting with particular external objects. Now, according to the
foundationalist, none of these beliefs are properly basic, so they must be
believed on the basis of evidence introduced via inductive, deductive, or
abductive arguments. ^2 In the end, good arguments�even inductive, deductive,
or abductive arguments� for the aforementioned beliefs are hard to find. Yet,
many people daily operate as if these things were true. Indeed, seeking
justification for beliefs such as these is an exercise in futility. It seems that the
foundationalist criteria for justification� from Descartes through Hume� is too
stringent even for itself, thereby creating a scenario where many beliefs held by
many [or most) people are unjustified.
At the very least, Plantinga has given the foundationalist and her
contemporary offspring something to think about. Indeed, if Plantinga's critique
is not satisfying, there are many more lining up at the door, not least ofwhich
would be Alasdair Macintyre^s and Charles Taylor^*. So, let us for our purposes
32 Ibid., 98.
33 Alasdair C. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory [Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2007] 1-5. Here, Maclntyre speaks of the troubled state of modernistic ethical
theory.
34 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity [Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989). Christian Smith, in his V\/hatis a Person, describes Taylor's
phenomenological epistemoiogy as "antinaturalistic." This would certainly set Taylor off in a
direction contrary to the foundationalism I have been describing.
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conclude that the Enlightenment project's quest for certainty through
foundationalism is sufficiently flawed. Where to from here? The postmodern
theologian desires to move beyond a foundationalist epistemoiogy. What theory
of knowledge is to replace foundationalism? For an answer we turn back to the
suggestion made by Grenz and Franke. They advocate for the related
philosophical positions of coherentism and pragmatism.
To be more precise, coherentism is an epistemological position while
pragmatism refers to a whole system of philosophy, but pragmatism is
comfortable with the claims of coherentism, thus able to absorb much, if not all,
of its epistemic assertions. The coherentist often employs the metaphor of a
groundless web of belief to describe how a belief gains justification. If a
particular belief coheres with other beliefs surrounding it, then it is acceptable.
What both the coherentist and pragmatist are uncomfortable with is
philosophical realism. And it is here that we come to a fork in the road. We are
expanding from the realm of epistemoiogy to now consider metaphysical
assumptions.
Of course, the critical realist will insist on realism; the postmodern
theologian will resist realism. There are many implications here, not least of
which are the consequent conceptions of truth. The postmodern theologian will
find herself abandoning correspondence theories of truth, considering them to
be a byproduct of a naive realism, all ofwhich supports a foundationalist
epistemoiogy. Truth for the postmodern, is found in the interconnectedness of
15
beliefs. Truth is seen as a derivative of one's entire belief system. Therefore,
what is true is a product of a particular interpretative community articulating
clearly their "local narrative" in a manner that is consistent and coherent with
other accepted beliefs. American pragmatist Charles Sanders Pierce offers a
clarifying word when he says, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real."^^ Here we see Pierce conflating the
current, most well articulated statement or proposition made by "all who
investigate" a particular matter, as being equal to the real. William James,
another pragmatist philosopher, goes further saying, "Truth for us is simply a
collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc.
are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it
pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are
made, in the course of experience."^^ For James, experience is elevated to the
position of arbitrator of truth. The emphasis for the postmodern theologian is
not on the articulation of an objective reality that is accessible and able to be
known to some degree, but rather on the inability to speak with authority about
the real.
The next move made by the postmodern theologian beyond a coherentist
epistemoiogy is to extend beyond the confines ofmetaphysical realism. Grenz
35 Charles Sanders Pierce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Philip Paul Wiener, Values in a
Universe ofChance: Selected Writings ofCharles S. Pierce [Stanford: Stanford U.P, 1958), 133.
36 William James, Pragmatism, a New Namefor Some Old Ways ofThinking (New York:
Longmans, Green, and co, 1928), 218.
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and Franke employ the linguistic philosophy ofWittgenstein as an aid toward
that end.37 The essence of their argument here is that truth and meaning are not
directly related to an external world of static facts, sitting in wait of the one who
would apprehend and know them. Rather, truth and meaning are a function of
language. Language is always situated in one context or another and it is the
manner of usage within those particular situations that constitute meaning and
truth. Thus, to return to Wittgenstein, one must play the "language game" to
determine truth. This involves the acknowledgement that language is a social
construct, and that sentences can have as many meanings as there are contexts
in which they may be uttered. Propositions can only be deemed "true" within
the bounds of their communal context of origin. If this claim is accepted, then
the idea ofmetaphysical realism, stating that there exists a reality outside of the
knowing subject that is unilaterally imposing itself on the subject, becomes a
difficult premise to accept.
What has been stated thus far is that the postmodern theologian has
replaced the idea of an authoritative metanarrative with that of relativistic local
narratives. Also, the Enlightenment brand of foundationalist epistemoiogy has
been thoroughly critiqued and found wanting. Foundationalism is then replaced
with a coherentist epistemological outlook supported by insights from
pragmatist philosophers. And, lastly, the postmodern theologian advocates for
the "turn to linguistics" as articulated by Wittgenstein. This move results in the
bypassing ofmetaphysical realism since meaning and truth are ultimately
37 Grenz and Franke, 42.
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situated within dynamic Hnguistic contexts. Attached to the move beyond
metaphysics is the disposing of the correspondence theory of truth, which claims
that reality is capable ofmatching our experience of it in something close to a
one to one ratio. As far as my lights go, these are the basic tenets of postmodern
theology. When considering these claims, the critical realist will find much with
which to agree, yet will disagree at critical junctures. Indeed, one of the
attractive strengths, in my view, of the critical realist position is its ability to
critique, absorb, and extend the ideas and insights of the postmodern theologian.
I turn my attention now to describing the central tenets of critical realism.
Following that, I will highlight some reasons why I believe it should be preferred
to the postmodern theological agenda.
Central Tenets ofCritical Realism
In this section I will situate critical realism in the broad context of other
understandings about the real. This discourse will naturally lead to a discussion
of the critical realist understanding of truth, which contrasts with the
postmodern understanding of truth as outlined above. After that, in order to
describe more clearly the nature of reality, I will engage with the idea of
emergence.
Critical realism can be thought of as a position between two extremes.^s
On one hand is the naive realist who believes that nothing stands between
himself and observed phenomena. There is no need for a hermeneutical process
38 The conception of critical realism as a mediate position is dependent on N.T. Wright's
explanation of critical realism in, N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People ofGod
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 31-37. I loosely follow him here.
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of interpretation since, after all, my instruments ofmeasurement are precise and
valid. The naive realist believes that he is capable of describing reality as it is�
the raw, unmediated picture of the real can be known. With that said, anything
that cannot be adequately measured, according to this position, cannot be
spoken of coherently. That is, those objects or ideas that cannot be empirically
tested end up being considered nonsense. The 20* century project of logical
positivism is an example of this way of thinking. As one follows this line of
thought it becomes easy to see the door to metaphysical enquiry closing,
shutting out with it any conception of ethical realism. Perhaps the biggest
problem for the naive realist is the insistence on a hard-line empirical
verification process for some things, but not for others.^^
History is a prime example. Historical "facts" are to be verified with the
same supposed rigor as scientific inquiry. What the naive realist fails to notice is
that the level of certainty with which science claims to operate is highly suspect.
As it turns out, the verification procedure for historical and empirical data are
quite similar. So, what we are left with is a brand of naive, common-sense
realism friendly to the reductionistic tendencies of the natural sciences,
narrowed in scope such that all that is real are physical objects containing the
properties we perceive them to have.
On the other hand, critical realism takes a moderating position against an
extreme form of phenomenalism. The phenomenalist's claim is that she cannot
39 Certainly, the naive realist falls prey to Plantinga's critique of foundationalist
epistemoiogy as outlined above. The evidential criteria for knowledge is too stringent, even for
the theory itself.
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be sure of anything beyond received sense data. She is not comfortable taking
the next step, like the naive realist, and stating with confidence that an external
reality in fact exists. Remaining in this perpetual state of doubt about reality can
lead her towards a solipsism�the view that hers is the only mind in existence
and everything else is but a figment of her imagination. It seems to me that both
of the aforementioned positions are relatively useless. We need something that
better matches the way we really think and live. I believe critical realism
provides that for us.
Philosopher Nancey Murphy has spoken of critical realists as "chastened
moderns" and that seems to be a proper descriptor.^o Her statement captures
the conviction of the modern era�that there indeed is a reality that can be
known. Critical realists agree that knowledge of the real is possible. The
"chastened" notion helps to capture the idea that critical realism makes no
pretense concerning the ability to describe reality in full. Unlike the naive
realist, the critical realist acknowledges that knowledge of the real is never
unmediated. Interpretation is always required. Theologian N.T. Wright is
instructive when he describes critical realism as a "...process of 'knowing' that
acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower
[hence 'realism'), while also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to
this reality lies along the spiraling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation
4" Nancey Murphy, "Scientific Realism and Postmodern Philosophy," British Journalfor
Philosophy ofScience 41 (1990): 291-303.
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between the knower and the thing known [hence 'critical').'^! The knowing
subject remains open to his or her observations of various objects being
challenged, yet is confident that some aspect of the real will survive the critical
process, thus allowing some measure of true speech about reality. It seems then,
that critical realism is a modification of the Lockean doctrine of indirect realism'^^
as well as a resistance of Berkeley's idealism. The critical realist certainly sees
no reason to posit any form of idealism, but also resists the Lockean quest for an
absolute foundation of knowledge.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to emphasize that I am not suggesting
some sort of return to an empirically based, chastened positivism as the way of
knowing reality. On the contrary, reality is a complex, multidimensional, layered
concept.'^3 In fact, it is this notion that highlights the strong antireductionistic
element of critical realism. Much of reality exists beyond our perception of it.
Thus, the implication that empirical investigation can tell the whole story is not
what critical realism is suggesting. There are at least three ways in which the
critical realist resists this slide back towards empiricism. First, the subject's
limited point of view is acknowledged. Observers cannot acquire a god's-eye
41 Wright, 35. Emphasis his
42 Or representationalism. Philosopher James K.A. Smith shared with me via email that
his contention with critical realism largely stems from his view that representationalism is
flawed. Thus, the paradigm for thinking of the real/anit-real debate is also flawed. Space
precludes, but this would be an interesting thread to follow in further research. At this juncture,
I would simply assert that the critical realist is not engaging in exactly the same project as Locke
and his indirect realism. Discovering a firm empirical foundation for knowledge of the real is not
the goal of the critical realist
43 Christian Smith. What Is a Person? Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral
Good from the Person Up (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 92-93.
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view of their object.'^'^ However, secondly, interpretation of sense data is
inevitable. This interpretative process extends beyond the fact that two persons
may be observing the same object from different physical locations�perhaps
they are both admiring the same mountain from opposite sides�to include the
idea that all observers bring with them varying assumptions, presuppositions,
beliefs, memories, etc.'^^ Simply, all subjects bring their worldview, with all
attached assumptions, to the table of interpretation. These held presuppositions
effect the interpretation of sense data. Thirdly, to extend the second point
above, all observers are situated within particular human communities�
networks of family members, friends, colleagues, etalA^ These communities will
influence and guide, to varying degrees, the outcome of observations and the
meaning ascribed throughout the process. These three points taken together
mean that there is no such thing as a neutral nor detached observer; therefore,
the critical realist is positioned to assert that humans can acquire a truthful,
though fallible knowledge of the real.'^^
Now, the reader may be wondering what is the significant difference thus
far between the postmodern theologian and the critical realist. Certainly, the
critical realistwill insist on realism, which goes against the grain of the
postmodern's desire to move beyond metaphysical reality and place truth and
meaning within language and interpretative communities. But, the critical
� Wright, 36.
� Ibid.
� Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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realist, as noted above, is quite comfortable with the rhetoric ofmediated,
situated knowledge. Surely, all human knowledge is pushed through an
interpretative grid that includes point-of-view, worldview considerations, and
the influence of the community.'^^ Yet, the stubborn insistence on reality
remains with the critical realist, and with that comes the assertion that truth,
rather than being the opinion of the community or being "made", is the
proposition which best describes reality as it is. What this assertion means is
that the measuring stick for truth is how well it corresponds to reality. Truth is
not relegated to the confines of linguistic communities of inquiry. Rather, the
critical realist insists that reality exists at many ontological levels yet is cohesive
and unified.
The above statement, then, that truth is the proposition that best
describes the way something really is, is not a simplistic statement advocating
for the classical correspondence theory of truth. No, classical correspondence is
what the naive realist would argue. Rather, as suggested by Notre Dame
sociologist Christian Smith, the relationship between a truth statement and
reality is transpositionally correspondent."^^ This notion moves us away from the
postmodern practice of locating truth within socio-linguistic communities, and
back towards truth as lining up with reality. Here it must be explained that
transpositional truth "...is understood not as mirroring but as transposing or
48 Here is a prime example of what I mean when I say that critical realism is able to
absorb many of the ideas of postmodern theology. In fact, Kevin Vanhoozer has gone so far as to
state that no contribution of postmodern theology is beyond the pale of a critical realist
approach to doing theology.
49 C. Smith, What is a Person?, 211.
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receding from nonlinguistic reality to the humanly personal and linguistically
conceptual. "50 So, what we have is the claim that language can be connected, to
some degree, with reality by means of critical methodologies^^ designed to
describe the way things really are.
This last statement anticipates an objection by the postmodern
theologian seeking to relegate truth to language and the interpretative
community. They might point out to the critical realist positing the
transpositional correspondence theory of truth that the very words they are
using to describe this idea come forth by virtue of his or her engagement with
various interpretative communities and find meaning only within the language
used to express his or her claims. In short, the critical realist would find this
objection to be simply uninteresting. Of course culturally specific language will
be used to express transpositional truth within local communal contexts.
Human knowledge must be apprehended and understood in some manner. This
contention is not to say that the totality of reality can ever be fully understood.
Reality is much bigger than what we can measure or comprehend. Also, human
knowledge, it must be remembered, is specific to humans.^^ \/\^e do not come to
know things in the same way as other sentient creatures. Humans, possessing
the tools of language and capacities for experimentation, naturally will construct
50 Ibid., 211-212.
51 What I mean here by critical methodologies is broad�anything from empirical
investigation by means of the scientific method to the employment of the cadre of literary critical
strategies that make up the descriptive enterprise of Biblical theology.
52 Ibid., 180.
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statements and symbols, employing them in their effort to describe the world as
it really is.
At this juncture, the gravitational pull of the Enlightenment's expectation
of gaining a certainty of knowledge is still strong and seems to pull the
postmodern theologian into its orbit. What I mean is that the postmodern seems
to assume that any quest to articulate the real automatically assumes an agenda
akin to that of the Enlightenment project In the case of the critical realist, this
contention is simply false. Humans come to know reality in specifically human
ways, but never can the real be fully comprehended. Nevertheless, just because
we cannot know reality with mathematical exactitude does not mean that we
cannot meaningfully speak about it. To argue then that one cannot attain
knowledge of the real because of the limitations of language and the lack of an
authoritative interpretative community (an authoritative metanarrative) simply
misses the point being made by the claim that truth is transpositionally
correspondent. Again, human knowledge is specific to and for humans. In order
to explore that knowledge, we construct meaningful statements and paradigms
about it, never asserting that these statements and paradigms are in their final
form. Thus, I say that to assert that the words used to describe reality, as we
perceive it, are in and of themselves socially constructed, and as a consequence
we cannot speak meaningfully about the real is, in the end, not a compelling
objection.53
53 Ibid., 217.
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Another central tenet of critical realism is the idea of emergence.^''^
Foundational questions about the real will continually arise�What is its nature?
How is it constructed? Are there any inherent observable patterns of reality?
Emergence helps us to engage and make sense of these types of questions
concerning reality, and it does so in a compelling manner. By definition,
"emergence refers to the process of constituting a new entity with its own
particular characteristics through the interactive combination of other, different
entities that are necessary to create the new entity but that do not contain the
characteristics present in the new entity.''^^ Emergence, therefore, always
involves the following four aspects.^^ First, at least two entities interactwith
each other at a "lower ontic level." Second, this interaction produces a new
entity which now possesses causal capacities able to operate at the new "higher
ontic level." Third, the higher ontic level entity is fully dependent upon the
interaction that occurred (or continuously is occurring) at the lower level.
Fourth, the higher-level entity, however, possesses causal capacities that do not
exist at the lower level and is therefore irreducible to the mere sum of its parts.
These four aspects constitute emergent reality.
What becomes apparent is that for the critical realist reality is multi-
layered. More precisely, reality exists on varying ontological planes or levels.
Each ontic plane possesses its own unique set of causal capacities. While being
54 Ibid., 25-42. Here, I follow C. Smith and his lucid description of emergence. See p. 25
n. 1 for a brief bibliography of recent literature on emergence. Also note the terms ontological
and ontic are used synonymously.
55 Ibid., 25-26.
56 Ibid., 26.
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fully dependent for existence on interactions occurring at lower ontic levels, the
higher-level entity possess a different capacity for causation. By acknowledging
the existence of different ontic levels of reality, each in possession of their own
causal capacities, we can account for the many systems of human inquiry. For
instance, "the different scientific disciplines of physics, chemistry, biology,
meteorology, physiology, psychology, sociology, astronomy, and so on. ..[take
into account]. ..different dynamics and mechanisms [that] operate to cause to
happen what actually does happen at that level."^^ These various disciplines
seek to describe reality as it is at the particular ontological level that they are
best suited to engage.
Ifwe were to stop here, one may consider reality to be somewhat
fragmented, but the critical realist employing the insights of emergence goes on
to emphasize that while reality is multi-layered, it is also interdependent and
interconnected. The aforementioned scientific disciplines are all
interconnected.^^ Indeed, any biologist will acknowledge the insight gained into
their discipline via the chemist. And it is here that we begin to see clearly
emergence as being a foil for reductionism.
To illustrate both the interconnectedness of distinct ontic levels and the
anti-reductionistic tendencies of emergence, consider the human hand.^^
Understand that the hand is a complex example, primarily because it is made up
" Ibid., 35
58 Ibid., 36.
59 There are certainly less complex examples of emergence than the human hand. See
ibid., 26-27 where C. Smith illustrates emergence by examining water. Three lower level
entities�two hydrogen molecules, one oxygen molecule� interact to form a new higher level
entity that possesses altogether different causal capacities than any of the lower level entities.
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ofmillions, if not billions of lower level entities,^^ each existing at their
respective ontological levels. Nevertheless, as we push through the example, I
believe it serves the purpose of showing the interconnectedness and
antireductionistic tendencies of emergent realism. Now, let us reduce the hand
to its component parts, then consider if one can properly describe the full range
of causal capacities the hand possesses by only considering what materials make
up a hand. First, in reducing the hand, we must sever it from the body. Clearly,
with this action we have lost the significant capacities of the hand, but for the
sake of example, let us continue. We could then explain that the hand has four
phalanges and one opposable thumb, skin, bone, muscle, tendon, and other
materials. We could describe the components of the vascular and nervous
systems present in the hand as well. In fact, we could divide and subdivide the
human hand all the way down to the atomic level and learn a great deal about
the function of each component part. Yet, does knowledge such as this give us
the ability to describe exhaustively the causal capacity of a fully functional
human hand? The answer must be no.
Now, imagine we have reconstructed the hand, including reattaching it to
the rest of the body. The hand is now able to function at an ontic level unlike any
of its component parts and its causal capacities are numerous. A properly
functioning human hand may be used for gripping, grabbing, pinching, shaking,
punching, etc. It is capable of transmitting whole language systems via sign
6" Consider the amount of lower level entities at the cellular level interacting to compose
the human hand.
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language as well as communicating other informal symbols that are loaded with
meaning capable of effecting other persons or material objects.^i Particular
hand gestures in particular environments can be quite meaningful. A clenched
fist raised above the head at the 1960 Mexico City Olympic Games proved to
have extensive causal capacity. It seems clear; the human hand is more than the
sum of its parts. Something new has come into being that prior to its emergence
did not exist. To reduce an emergent entity and then believe that to be the best
avenue for understanding it is wrongheaded.62 In fact, emergent entities are
often most fully understood within the context of the ontological level that they
exist.
Much more could be stated concerning emergence, however space
precludes. In summary, emergence occurs when two or more lower level
entities interact to form a new higher level entity. The new entity depends upon
the lower level entities for its existence but possesses causal capacities that
could not exist otherwise within lower level entities. Reality is stratified, yet
unified through the process of emergence. Emergence, then, is ardently anti-
^1 Tiie "peace sign" or the "o.i<." symbol come to mind here. Also, consider the complex
hand sign systems used in various sports like baseball or football.
62 This is not to say that everything in existence is unable to be explained by
understanding what it is made of See ibid., 36-39 where C. Smith explains that a bag of chicken
feed does not possess significant properties over and above its component parts. Acknowledging
that some real entities do not possess significant causal power even after they interact with one
another may guard against the critic who seeks to conflate emergence with some strict form of
holism. That is, it does not seem that the bringing together of the component parts in a bag of
chicken feed adds any significant properties to the new mixture. If the chicken farmer fed
his/her chickens all the ingredients in chicken feed but from different feeding troughs, it seems
the desired results of growth, health, and/or egg production would be the same. Sometimes
answering what is this? is satisfied by answering what is this made of? Often, however, it is not
Sometimes what we really want to know is what is this capable of? The reductionist short-
circuits the process of inquiry by insisting that what is this? can always be satisfied by answering
what is this made of? Not everything is as simple as a bag of chicken feed.
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reductionist. Knowing what a particular entity is composed of does not always
enlighten us as to the capabilities of that entity. Gaining an understanding of
emergence is an asset for the critical realist as she seeks to explain, as accurately
as is possible, the nature of the real.
Why Critical Realism?
At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the merits of critical realism
over and against the assumptions of the postmodern theologian. First, I believe
that critical realism constructs for the Christian theologian a platform for
profitable dialogue with (social and empirical] scientists. Second, I contend that
critical realist presuppositions allow for a robust, flexible biblical hermeneutic to
be developed. Both of these reasons are the center points of the next two
chapters, so I will refrain from further comment now.
Be that as it may, there are three other reasons that I see as compelling, to
one degree or another, in accepting the central tenets of critical realism over
those of postmodernism. First, I believe that many ideas of the postmodern can
be absorbed into the paradigm of critical realism. One example is the rhetoric
associated with coherence. A coherentist epistemoiogy speaks of belief being
justified by the degree to which it "fits" with other attendant, supporting beliefs.
There is no reason whatsoever that the critical realist could not talk in the same
terms. Certainly, there are going to be many hypotheses or propositions that
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gain credence by virtue of the way that they dove tail with other held beliefs. At
the same time, the critical realist measures the veracity of all belief by its
transpositional correspondence to what is known about reality. This
consideration does make room for value judgments concerning different
attempts at describing the way things really are. Some propositions will be
better than others. In determining this, it seems perfectly acceptable to consider
proposition /I in light of the accepted propositions B, C, and D. Of course, the
difference on this point between the critical realist and the postmodern is that
the measure for truth is not in how well proposition A fits with B, C, and D, but
rather in how well A transpositionally corresponds to reality.
Another postmodern idea that can be absorbed by the critical realist is
that all things are in flux. The postmodern often reminds us that nothing is
stable and that change is inevitable. The critical realist, given emergence, should
be comfortable with this notion, in a qualified sense. That is, reality while being
unified and interconnected is also dynamic and changing. New ontological levels
of reality are emerging all the time. In that sense, the real is in flux.
Secondly, the discipline of theology does include an aspect of cognition.
These cognitive aspects include presuppositions about the universe, and the
nature of reality and morality.^^ it is here, within the cognitive element, that
interdisciplinary dialogue can occur. If it can be accepted that, for example,
scientific disciplines and theology are seeking to make meaningful statements
about a unified, stratified reality, then a starting point for dialogue has been
63 van Huyssteen, 13.
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established. Perhaps then the "...epistemological overlap between scientific and
theological rationality..." can be acknowledged.^'^ Also, the view that scientific
ways of knowing are wholly different from those of theology can begin to be
broken down. "Theology as well as the various sciences all grapple with what
we view as different but very real aspects of our experience."^^
Third and last, critical realism retains the realist paradigm for
interpreting the world as well as the idea of transpositional correspondence.
The reason that I find this tandem to be compelling is that it has great
explanatory power. To explain the idea that there is one reality that all attempt
to describe it from their varying perspectives is, in my view, not a difficult
concept to grasp. Further, the concept of a fallibilist knowledge of the real is not
a large leap either. That is, explaining to someone that despite the existence of
one unified reality beyond our sense perception, access to that reality is never
full or complete. Again, I contend that there is great explanatory power inherent
in these ideas evidenced by the fact that most people live their lives as if there is
a reality to engage, whether they have reflected deeply on the topic or not.
In this chapter I have sought to explain the central tenets of both
postmodern theology and critical realism. In doing so we have found a key
contrast between the postmodern's desire to move beyond realism and
correspondence theories of truth while the critical realist insists on retaining
realism and a transpositional correspondence theory of truth. Also, I have
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 14.
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briefly discussed five reasons that I believe critical realism to be a stronger
option than that of postmodernism for the Christian theologian. Two of those
five reasons are that 1) critical realism provides opportunity for fruitful dialogue
with the scientific community and 2) critical realism allows for the development
of a viable, robust Biblical hermeneutic. These topics will be unpacked in greater
detail below. It is to the dialogue between faith and science that we now turn.
CHAPTER 2
The Critical Realist Theologian and Science
Thus far, I have argued that critical realism provides a better foundation
for theological inquiry than the presuppositions associated with postmodern
theology. I have presented five reasons why 1 think this is so. One of those
reasons is that the critical realist is positioned to enter into significant
interdisciplinary dialogue. In observing the grand mountain that is reality, we
may be assessing it from different perspectives, using different methods, but we
are all looking at the same mountain. With that as a presupposition, I contend
that the critical realist theologian stands ready to dialogue with the scientific
community. In this chapter, I will explore the trajectory of that dialogue. In
doing so, I will outline the history of evangelicalism and science, showing how a
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critical realist perspective is able to integrate scientific insight without insisting
on wholesale abandonment of classical Christian doctrine. To support this claim,
I turn to Alvin Plantinga once more, employing his argument wherein he finds no
contradiction in affirming that God regularly intervenes in the physical universe.
Lastly, I will return to critical realism by highlighting some significant
contributions it makes in facilitating dialogue between the theologian and
scientist. First, I must define the terminology that will be used in this discussion.
It is important to recall that I am working from a Christian evangelical
stance. This is because the discussion of religion and science can be too broadly
conceived if one does not define the particular assumptions of the particular
religious system. All religions do not make the same claims.^^ Evangelicalism
and science have a complex past. It would be a form of scholarly negligence to
reduced this complexity to a few sweeping generalizations. Therefore, 1 will
follow the four-fold criteria coined by historian D.W. Bebbington in determining
what is an evangelical: (1) one who places emphasis on a conversion experience,
(2) one who emphasizes evangelism�the spreading of the gospel, (3) one
holding a high view of the Bible as God's revelation to humanity, and (4] one
who emphasizes Christ's sacrifice on the cross.^^ These four convictions sprang
66 Here it is good to acknowledge that the work of Ian Barbour is foundational in the
conversation between religion and science. However, it is significant to note for the purposes set
out in this chapter that Barbour ultimately advocates for a form of process theology. Most
theologians would agree that the claims of process theology augment the picture of classical
Christianity in many significant ways such that it is often labeled as a panentheism. I am arguing,
however, that classical Christian doctrine is compatible with scientific insight I see no need to
adopt process theology in order to make the religion/science conversation intelligible.
67 David W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1 730's to
the 1980's (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 2-3.
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from the fertile ground that was the English Reformation and have expanded to
encompass many Protestant traditions.^^ yet, even the last statement is a slight
misnomer as evangelicalism is quite transdenominational or even
transtraditional. One could speak of a "Presbyterian evangelical," an "Anglican
evangelical," a "Methodist evangelical," or even a "Catholic evangelical."^^ Thus,
it is this broad conception of evangelicalism that I mean to utilize in this chapter.
As far as the term Christian goes, what I mean to express are the central
beliefs of classical Christianity as found in both the Nicene and Apostle's creeds.
This marks a broad enough landscape to encompass Protestant and Catholic
Christians, I believe, quite comfortably. Also, it is vital to understand that the
creedal expressions of classical Christianity are silent as to the specifics of
creation. In other words, they acknowledge God as "maker of heaven and earth"
or "maker of all things visible and invisible," but say nothing as to the specifics of
how this creation process obtained. So, given classical Christianity, one could
speculate across the spectrum of creationist theories all the way to views on
theistic evolution. However, to insist that classical Christianity somehow asserts
a specific position on the origin of humankind or the universe is to be in error.
Taking the position of classical Christianity as a starting point is to take a
flexible, non-dogmatic stance from which dialogue can begin.
68 Mark A. Noll, "Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and
Religion: A Historical Introduction [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002], 262. As a
general chronology one could think of Evangelicals as coming on the scene around the 1730's
during the First Great Awakening. Of course, they are still with us today.
69 Alister E. McGrath, Science & Religion: An Introduction [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1999], 41.
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Just as broad is what I mean to express when I use the term science. I am
not hmiting the term to the "hard" or "soft" sciences. What I mean is that science
is the enterprise of human inquiry that gathers knowledge of the world derived
from testable empirical hypotheses.^o
Another term or concept needing clarification is that of the model of
interaction engendered in the dialogue between the critical realist theologian
and the scientist. Alister McGrath, the well-known scientist and theologian now
heading the Center for Theology, Religion, and Culture at King's College in
London, describes two broad historical models concerning the interaction of
religion and science.^^ First is the confrontational model. This model tends to
paint a picture ofwarfare between theology and science as if each were engaged
in a battle of epic proportions, fighting for every inch of territory. This is often
rightly linked with American fundamentalism, a particular stream of North
American Protestant Christianity. The critical realist theologian, however, better
fits McGrath's nonconfrontational model.
On this model the idea adopted is that all truth is God's truth. Liberal
Protestants as well as particular Roman Catholic scholars have especially
embraced the nonconfrontational model. These Catholic scholars formed the
method of biblical criticism that would become known as modernism or radical
higher criticism.'^^ Modernism, in this sense, is best thought of as a method of
interpretation that sought to incorporate Enlightenment thought into the church,
70 Noil in Ferngren, 264.
71 McGrath, 44-50.
72 Ibid., 31-38.
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which at the end of the 19* century had not been done73 The modernist agenda
was quite radical�more so than the liberal Protestant�and found special
importance in the theory of Darwinian evolution. They found little "...difficulty
in eliminating those aspects ofChristian thought which they found
inconvenient."^-^ Liberal Protestants, incorporating some of the critical
methodology of the Catholic moderns, have likewise found little or no conflict
with science. A central assumption of theirs since the days of their founding
thinker F.D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) has been to transform the archaic
words of the Bible into a message that is culturally palatable and relevant to the
times. What is clear is that modern critics and liberal Protestants have
significantly adjusted doctrine in light of scientific discovery.
The theological programs of the liberal Protestant and the modern
biblical critic have a nonconfrontational relationship with scientific discovery.
Can the evangelical critical realist theologian holding to a classical expression of
Christian doctrine do the same? Is the abandonment or radical adjustment of
certain long-held doctrines of the church inevitable? In short, the answer is no. I
see no fatal conflict in the assumptions of the critical realist evangelical
theologian and the scientific enterprise. Yet, to answer in such a concise manner
would be reductive, over-simplifying the complexity of the question. Therefore,
at this point what is needed is an understanding of the historical context in
which evangelicalism and scientific inquiry both grew. Specifically, we must
73 Ibid., 35.
74 Ibid., 37.
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consider the past relationship between evangelicalism and science. To that I
now turn.
Evangelicalism, Fundamentalism, and Science
In this section I intend to show that the overall attitude within
evangelicalism towards science has been one of deep concord and affirmation. A
closer look at the historical record on this topic will be instructive. Indeed, it
was not until the 1920's that the North American brand of fundamentalism
arose. This form of theology was unashamedly confrontational in its model of
engagement with mainstream science, particularly those sciences employing the
assumptions of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Now, this is not to say that there
were no dissenting voices amongst evangelicals prior to the 1920's. What is
noteworthy, however, is that those dissenting voices were marginal.
Fundamentalism moved into the fore with its critique ofmainstream science in a
way that, prior to, had not been done.
18^^ and 1 9^'' CenturyHistorical Context It is important to keep in mind
that since the time of Descartes, the world had been undergoing a shift from the
teleological assumptions ofAristotelian physics to what would ultimately
become the mechanical model of Newtonian physics.^^ Therefore, by the 18^
century, as evangelicalism emerged, scientific inquiry and discovery was nothing
new. The 18* century theological approaches of John Wesley and George
Whitefield bear this out as they emphasized the empirical experience of
75 Peter Millican, "1.3 Science from Aristotle to Galileo," lecture, General Philosophy,
Oxford University, March 10, 2011, downloaded from I-Tunes U.
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Christianity in what they called "experimental" Christianity.^^ It is also not
surprising to find, by the end of the 18* century, many evangelicals appealing to
apologetical natural theology in defending their faith.^^ Examples of this
relatively serene interaction between evangelicalism and science abound.^^
It was in the 18* century that the disciplines of geology and paleontology
became distinct entities of scientific inquiry, forging into the uncharted waters of
earth history.^^ Prehuman earth history, formerly considered to be a single,
uniform epoch, now appeared to be characterized by the succession of
distinctive flora and fauna increasingly resembling our present world. "This
new vista of earth history equaled the Copernican revolution in its intellectual
implications, reducing the relative significance of the human world in time just
as early modern astronomy had diminished it in space."^! So, it is surely
accurate to view these findings as significant within scientific and theological
communities. Indeed, at this time there were no fewer than 140 estimates of the
earth's age advocated for by scientists and clergymen alike, ranging from 3,616
to 6,484 years B.C.^^ Hearing scientists beginning to speak in terms of "millions
and millions" of years of earth history was a new development. This did prompt
spirited debate as well as ingenious reconciliation schemes that sought to offer
76 Noll in Ferngren, 265.
77 Ibid.
78 Really, one could argue that Christianity in general, not just evangelicals, had an
amiable relationship with science for most of the 18^ and 19* centuries.
79 Peter M. Hess, "Natural History," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and Religion: A Historical
Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 196.
80 Nicholas A. Rupke, "Geology and Paleontology," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and
Religion: A Historical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 180.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 181-181.
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exegetical alternatives for biblical interpreters seeking to incorporate the
insights of the new geology.^^ Nonetheless, "By and large, mainstream Christian
geologists and paleontologists succeeded in coming to terms with the new
geology. ..Flood geology, with its tenets of a young earth and. ..cataclysmic deluge,
became regarded as incorrect and antiquated.''^^ Curiously, 20* and 21^^ century
American fundamentalism has effectively excavated the old fossils of this long
dead ideology. The new geological insights of the 19* century certainly sparked
conversation amongst theologians and scientists, but the point not to be missed
is that the nature of that conversation was by in large collegial.
Another example of an earlier era of relative peace and harmony between
evangelicals and scientists comes out of an examination of the history of
evolutionary theory. Surprising as this sounds to those who have witnessed the
battles for and against teaching evolutionary theory in American public schools,
18* and 19* century evolutionary science was not so polarizing. This is not to
say that there was no passionate debate between theologians and scientists. Any
conception of this era described as less than a time of protean theorizing and
dynamic scientific inquiry is reductionistic to some degree. The complexity of
the era must be acknowledged.
83 Ibid., 184-185. The "day-age theory" and the "gap theory" emerged as popular
exegetical moves that sought to incorporate theological convictions with science by effectively
separating the history of the earth from the history of humankind. The Bible dealt with
humanity while science postulated about the age of the earth.
84 Ibid. 192.
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The 18* century marks the beginning of the scientific communities'
challenge to the 17* century notion of simple creationism.^^ Simple creationism
argued that a wise and benevolent God had created the world and was guiding
the development of species and their environments ever upward towards higher
moral planes of existence. The jewel in the crown of this process was
humankind. This view was clearly teleological and was completely comfortable
with metaphysical assertions about reality, including descriptive ethics. That is,
the world and its creatures are heading somewhere, and God is guiding them
toward that end. This is simple creationism. Science began to challenge this
picture in the 18* century, but this challenge by no means came in the form of an
immediate assault.
A key building block for early evolutionists was formed from the new
insights of geology. The earth had been shown to be much older than anyone
had previously thought; a literal reading of the Genesis creation account became
difficult to reconcile with science.^^ Prior to these geological insights, materialist
thinkers such as Georges Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, and Denis Diderot began to
suggest that life may possibly be spontaneously generated on earth and that
species may adapt to their environments through time.^^ By the end of the 18*
century, Jean Baptiste Lamarck had developed his theory of the adaptation of
species to their environments "...by supposing that individual animals modified
85 Peter J. Bowler, "Evolution," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and Religion: A Historical
Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 220.
86 Ibid., 221.
87 Ibid., 221.
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their behavior in response to environmental change, and any resulting changes
in their bodily structure v^ere inherited/'ss These materialistic theories may
appear to threaten the very essence of the classical Christian faith, but the
response of the Christian community was not excessively reactionary. William
Paley [1743-1805), a British philosopher and apologist, simply found Lamarck's
findings as further indication that a benevolent God was guiding the adaptation
process, all by design.89 For Paley and many others, God was still guiding the
process; thus, the tenets of simple creationism could remain.
There did emerge in the 18* century, however, a radical materialist
group amongst certain British anatomists. They sought to attack the notion of a
"static, designed universe that sustained the social structure.''^^ In this radical
sense, "Evolutionism became firmly linked to materialism, atheism, and radical
politics."^! In response to this, Richard Owen, a British anatomist himself,
propagated an argument similar to Paley's. In short, he put forth the idea that
comparative anatomy within animal groups would reveal an underlying unified
structure in the composition of the creatures.^2 Owen saw this as evidence for
the Creator's design process. It becomes clear that through the 18* century and
into the 19* evangelicals felt little threat from the discoveries of science so long
as there remained room for asserting that God, in some manner, was guiding the
process.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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Be that as it may, the largest threat to simple creationism has yet to be
mentioned. In 1859, Charles Darwin published his book. Origin ofSpecies.
Darwin's key contribution to the conversation was his theory of natural
selection, or as Herbert Spencer termed it, "survival of the fittest."^^ in effect, the
radical expression of natural selection theory stood contra to the notion of
simple creationism as there no longer remained any room for asserting the
design thesis. Nature was not necessarily moving towards higher levels of
organization; there was no single goal or end on the horizon.^'^ Yet, the design
thesis was stubborn. Many evangelicals and other Christians came to accept
evolutionary theory along with the theological addition that God was still
guiding the process. While this did represent somewhat of a compromise by the
theological camp, most people, no matter the level of religious conviction, did
not desire a view of the universe that was aimlessly heading in random
directions.9^ Therefore, we can begin to see that evolutionary theory and
evangelicalism were not diametrically opposed from the start. The 18* and 19*
centuries were predominantly marked by dialogue and debate between
Christian and scientific communities, not segregation and alienation. Indeed, "It
took many decades for the full implications of Darwin's thinking to become
apparent...."96 The backdrop for this story is early 20* century America.
" Ibid., 223.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 224.
96 Ibid.
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20*'' Century�The Rise ofFundamentalism in America. Evangelicals and
science have a storied past. Prior to and after Darwin's theory of evolution most
evangelical scientists have considered their research as supporting God's design
in the universe.^^ I have attempted to show that evangelicalism and science
share a complex history of inquiry that is by and large not marked by continuous
conflict. Instead, the historical record shows, I believe, many examples of a close
alliance between science and religion. To the contrary, the confrontational
model paints a picture of warfare between theology and science as if the two
enterprises have a history of constant conflict punctuated by larger explosions,
always clashing on some level. And it is this model of interaction between
theology and science that came to dominate the relationship in the 20* century.
There are many reasons to see the confrontational model as deficient.
First, confrontationalists ignore the vast number of instances wherein science
and religion worked, not in conflict, but as either, "...independent, mutually
encouraging, or even symbiotic" enterprises.^^ Second, especially when
employed by scientists hostile to religion, the confrontational thesis truncates
history, allowing it only to convey the perspective that progress is inevitable and
will win out in the end.^^ Third, science and religion are treated as monoliths.^oo
Seldom if ever have the entire scientific or theological communities responded
with uniformity to particular problems or challenges. Yet, confrontationalists
97 Noll in Ferngren, 271. See pp. 269-271 for a larger list of significant British and
American evangelical scientists of the 18^ and 19* centuries.
98 Colin A. Russell, "The Conflict of Science and Religion," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science
and Religion: A Historical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 8.
99 Ibid. Sometimes this is referred to as "Whiggish historiography."
Ibid., 9.
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paint a dualistic picture of strife between religion and science. This is
reductionist history, and it distorts reality showing little appreciation for nuance
or "gray areas." Last, confrontationalists tend to elevate "...minor squabbles, or
even differences of opinion..." to the status of grand conflicts.ioi The Huxley-
Wilberforce debate is a prime example. This so called "debate" was actually an
informal conversation between the two men following the reading of a paper at
the Oxford University Museum of Natural History. No written record of their
discourse is known to exist; however, both gentlemen have often been quoted
(or misquoted) often times igniting conflict. Despite all of this, the
confrontational model persists, and it is out of this paradigm of engagement that
American fundamentalism arose and is sustained.
Fundamentalism in America is marked by a confrontationalist interaction
with mainstream science, a literalist biblical hermeneutic, and a Bible-based
science developed to replace the "flawed" mainstream science of the
contemporary age. This Bible-based science is often referred to as creation
science or creationism.^^'^ In the late 19* century, debates over Darwinian theory
remained primarily relegated to academic circles where many evangelicals had
accepted a form of organic evolution.io^ yet, the populace had not followed
suite. In that era (late 19* century) most Americans would have advocated for
some form of special creation in articulating their understanding of how the
101 Ibid.
102 Creationism or creation science often includes the tenets of six literal days of creation
as depicted in the book of Genesis as well as floodgeology which seeks to explore the geological
implications of a world-wide flood.
103 Ronald L. Numbers, "Creationism since 1859," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and
Religion: A Historical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 279.
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universe and humankind had obtained.io^ This contrast between the
inteihgentsia and the populace would increasingly spill over into the public
square. Perhaps no event did as much to shed light on the creation-evolution
controversy as the 1925 Scopes Trial.
William Jennings Bryan, the thrice-defeated Democratic nominee for
President of the United States and Presbyterian layman, became aware of an
effort to ban the teaching of evolution in Kentucky's public schools.^o^ The year
was 1922. A similar effort actually became law by the end of the decade in three
states�Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi.^o^ n important to understand
that Bryan is representative of a larger para-church movement that sought to
keep evolution out of schools. Indeed, one of the assumptions of this movement
was that Darwinian evolutionary theory was intellectually untenable and was in
the midst of being discarded by scientists.^o^ In actuality, at this time a small
minority of scientists were questioning the viability of evolutionary theory, but
their publications led creationists to the sweeping conclusion that the academy
had practically jettisoned the theory. Further, Bryan, being known for is
populist agenda as well as a man of staunch faith, was a "perfect fit" for carrying
the torch of antievolutionism.
The Scopes Trial itself, held in Dayton, Tennessee, was more of an
exhibition than a legal proceeding. The 24-year-old general science teacher and
Ibid., 279.
105 Ibid., 280.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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football coach John T. Scopes was on trial for allegedly teaching evolutionary
theory in a public school.io^ There were many factors at work in the
proceedings. These included the desire for Dayton to "put itself on the map," the
desire of the defense to strike down the antievolution law rather than actually
defend Scopes, and the desire of the public and the media to enjoy the event of
seeing Bryan debate the also famous Clarence Darrow of the defense. The
immediate result was a victory for the prosecution (Bryan), but most neutral
observers viewed the trial as a draw.^o Through time, however, the Scopes Trial
has worked as a polarizing force in America spurring antievolutionary
proponents onward as well as hardening the resolve of supporters of
evolutionary theory. Most certainly, the dichotomy between theology and
science�specifically evolutionary theory�which was on display for a national
audience at the Scopes trial, is still present in American culture to this day.
Much more could be brought to light concerning evangelicalism,
fundamentalism, and science. Their histories are complex and interesting. What
is noteworthy for our purposes is the different models of engagement employed
by the evangelical and the fundamentalist. The evangelical maintains that
science and religion can adopt a nonconfrontational model of engagement while
the fundamentalist emphasizes only the conflict. But is the evangelical
theologian realistic in his or her expectation that the two spheres of theology
and science could ever learn to share a plot of epistemological real estate? Alvin
Edward J. Larson, "The Scopes Trial," in Gary B. Ferngren, Science and Religion: A
Historical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 290.
110 Ibid., 297.
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Plantinga believes this is entirely possible. Next, we will consider Plantinga's
thesis that there is no science/religion conflict inherent in the proposition that
God regularly interacts with the physical world. This is part of a larger work
wherein Plantinga, considering the relationship between classical Christianity
and science, claims that what appears on the surface to be discord is not the
case. Classical Christianity and science actually have a relationship of deep and
resounding harmony.
Plantinga on God's Interaction in the World
In a recent lecture delivered at Taylor University, Plantinga put forth the
idea that according to classical Christianity, God regularly and dependably acts
in the physical world.m This sort of action could be thought of as those sorts of
physical occurrences such as the rotation and revolution of the Earth, the
growing of a seed, the rain and rock cycles, etc. Classical Christianity has long
held that all of these actions are due to God's sustaining or conserving of the
universe. So, in a sense one might say that the sun rises or the seed grows due to
God's action in the world. This sort of statement is relatively benign within most
Christian circles. However, when one begins to posit God's special action in the
universe, the battle lines are quickly drawn. Special action includes God's
1" Alvin Plantinga, "Divine Action in the World," lecture, Taylor University, March 2,
2011. This section follows this lecture.
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response to prayer, healings, the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, the process
of sanctification, etc. These are miraculous acts.
Many liberal theologians have viewed special interaction as interference,
connoting an unwelcome act of God. In other words, any act beyond the creation
and conservation of the world that is attributed to God would run contrary
somehow to the findings of science. This is termed anti-interventionism.
Plantinga, here, is explaining the assumptions of one like the liberal Protestant
who adheres to a nonconfrontational model between faith and science, but
allows science to eschew biblical doctrine when doctrine and science clash. The
tension is evident. Classical Christian doctrine assumes that God often
transcends the boundaries of creation and conservation, becomes immanent in
the world, and performs special acts. The Liberal Protestant relegates God to
creation and conservation.
Plantinga then moves to explain that the anti-interventionists assume the
"Old Picture" (OP) of physics. That is, the world is a complex machine, operating
by certain fixed laws, all within a closed system. Action in the universe is
determined by whatever happens at any particular time, together with the laws
of physics coming to bear on that action, resulting in whatever happens at any
other time. What is missing from the equation is a justification by the OP for
accepting that the universe is indeed a closed system. Why should one accept
this? There seems to be no scientific� i.e. measurable or testable�manner in
which to assert that the universe is a closed system. Therefore, God's special
action is not in conflict with science on the OP.
49
Now, if there is an Old Picture, there must be a New Picture. The New
Picture takes into account the theories of quantum mechanics. In quantum
theory, laws are considered probabilistic, rather than deterministic. So, it is
probable that I will sink if I attempt to walk on water, but it is not wholly
determined. Nonetheless, many theologians and scientists, schooled in quantum
theory, still find it difficult to accept any sort of special divine action.112 Their
largest objection to God's special intervention is that he would be at best
inconsistent and at worst contradictory. In other words, how can God, the
creator and upholder of natural law, simultaneously break the very law he is
upholding via special action? What kind of God would this be? Would caprice
mark his character rather than benevolence?
Plantinga gives the following answer
What exactly is wrong with the idea that God should intervene�
arbitrary inconsistency? But is this really true? There would be
arbitrariness and inconsistency only if there were no special
reason for
acting contrary to the usual regularities. Raising jesus from the
dead.
In other cases too, however, he might have reasons for 'dealing in
two
different manners' with his cosmos; how could we be even
reasonably
sure that he doesn't? Perhaps he aims to establish basic
regularities,
thus making science and free intelligent action possible for his
creatures. But perhaps he also has good reason for sometimes
acting
contrary to those regularities: to mark special occasions, for
example.
The "theologians and scientists" noted here by Plantinga are consist of the highly
reputable and earnest scholars comprising the "Divine Action Project"�a 15 year series of
conferences and publications that began in 1988.
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or to make clear his love or his power, or to authorize what
someone
says, or to guide history in a certain direction. Why should any of
this
be in any way incompatible with his unsurpassable greatness?
In essence, Plantinga is saying that an accusation of God being arbitrary in
his special divine action is actually a demand to know God's reason for acting in
the first place. Yet, not being allowed to know God's reasoning process does not
disqualify God from having good reasons to act. Furthermore, Plantinga points
out that an objection such as the one raised by the New Picture scientists and
theologians is clearly a philosophical or theological objection, not a scientific
objection. Thus, he concludes that there is no scientific objection under the Old
or the New Picture inhibiting God's special action in the world.
What we have seen thus far in this chapter is first, that scientists and
evangelicals holding to the classical expressions of Christian doctrine have a long
but complex nonconfrontational history. This may not seem to be the case in
light of the confrontational motivation of fundamentalism. However, I have
aimed to show that fundamentalists and scientific confrontationalists alike have
manufactured the need to set theology and science off against one another. One
part of the way this has been achieved is to turn the truth of the relationship
between religion and science (particularly between evangelicals and science)
into a fiction by marring the historical account such that all that remains is a
story of warfare. After that, I brought to light Plantinga's argument wherein he
finds no contradiction with the claims of science and the special divine action of
God in the world. This argument is important for our purposes as it provides an
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avenue for upholding the doctrinal claims of classical Christianity contra the
adjusted doctrine of liberal Protestantism and modern biblical criticism. In
other words, being able to coherently demonstrate God's regular interaction
with the natural, physical world as being logically possible allows the evangelical
critical realist to resist the need to radically adjust classical Christian doctrine as
well as resist the option of taking the fundamentalist's confrontational stance. It
is a safeguard for both theology and science. Finally, we must turn our attention
back to critical realism, noting more ofwhat it has to offer.
What Does Critical Realism Bring to the Discussion?
I have been arguing all along that the evangelical theologian seeking to
maintain the expression of classical Christianity is aided by subscribing to
critical realism. In what follows, I will offer three reasons to support this claim.
First, critical realism brings with it a postfoundational critique of
foundationalism. In other words, the foundationalist tendencies within science
and theology must be acknowledged. By doing so, an epistemological space is
cleared where dialogue can ensue. If this is not achieved the old confrontational
paradigm will rule the day. Moving to a postfoundational epistemological stance
may seem a simple point to make, but I believe it is easier said than done. The
strict scientific materialist and the literalist fundamentalist have more in
common than they might care to admit. Both see their disciplines as engaged in
conflict.113 Both seek a secure, indubitable foundation for their specific type of
113 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, "Postfoundationalism in Theology and Science: Beyond
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knowledge.114 Both claim that a choice must be made between the claims of
science and theology.ii^ In a postfoundational setting, none of these attributes
need be the case.
Old habits die hard, and surely moving to a postfoundational
epistemoiogy will involve the loss of certain epistemic habits. If this can be
achieved, there are many attendant implications. One such implication is that
the opposition between scientific rationality and other forms of rationality
would completely breakdown.i^^ With this breakdown comes the breakdown of
another perpetuator of the confrontational model�the fact-value dichotomy.
Science has long considered itself as trading in objective reality thus having the
ability to make value-free statements. In the postfoundational context, this is no
longer possible. With each theory choice, deliberation, and evaluation, scientists
"place certain kinds of value judgments at the heart of the scientific method
itself."ii7 Furthermore, it could be argued that "decisions by individual scientists
to work on one problem rather than another already imply value judgments
about the superiority of knowledge to ignorance, intelligibility to
unintelligibility, and truth to error."ii8
The postfoundationalist epistemoiogy of critical realism forces both the
theologian and scientist to consider their foundationalist tendencies. It also
Conflict and Consonance," in Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, eds.
Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1998), 16.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., 25.
117 Ibid.
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breaks down the fact-value dichotomy asserting that there are no value-free
judgments as we are all situated in certain cultural-linguistic contexts doing our
best to interpret reality as we encounter it.
Second, building off of the first point, critical realism insists that reality is
structured, layered, interconnected, and unified. Therefore, both theology and
science are seeking to describe an ontological state of reality using their
particular method of inquiry. Nevertheless, they are both describing a portion of
the same unified reality. If both the theologian and scientist can accept this, I
believe the possibilities for profitable, and perhaps groundbreaking work can
begin. I do acknowledge, however, the possibility that both may explore the
same topic and come out with contradictory conclusions. In short, so what! If
the conviction that we are truly examining the same reality is held firm, then
may the dialectical process begin. Perhaps new methods will be developed for
considering contradictory conclusions drawn by the scientist and theologian.
Keeping the tenets of critical realism close at hand will help to remind all parties,
once again, that there are no value-free facts and that emergent reality is
stratified yet unified.
Third and last, real emergent human persons, to the critical realist, are
more than material entities. They possess causal powers beyond the sum of
their empirical parts. This notion, if accepted by the scientist, will most certainly
redefine the boundaries of scientific realism beyond the empirical to the
metaphysical. Discussions of the immortal soul as well as descriptive ethics may
become central topics on the interdisciplinary research agenda rather than be
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relegated to theology and philosophy only. Of course, to make it this far nothing
less than a paradigm shiftwill do. The scientist especially, as one working in a
theory laden context, should be aware that even the most sacred of assumptions,
including the neo-Darwinian evolutionary synthesis, may be questioned on some
level. The idea that real emergent human persons composed ofmore than the
sum of their material components and in possession of causal powers enabling
them to effect reality, even as it exists within their own self, is a deep and rich
concept. Critical realism brings this into the foreground.
In this chapter I have argued that critical realism provides the best
ground for dialogue between the scientist and the evangelical seeking to uphold
classical Christianity. I have asserted that critical realism upholds the long
standing tradition of theology and science engaged in a nonconfrontational
dialogue. Plantinga's proposition that God's regular, special interaction in the
world does not conflict with scientific inquiry was employed to bolster my claim
that critical realism affords the evangelical theologian the possibility of a
nonconfrontational space for dialogue with the scientific community. Also,
Plantinga's thesis helps to show that the evangelical theologian upholding
classical Christianity need not retreat to the supposed safe house of
fundamentalism or acquiesce on the alteration of doctrinal matters along with
the liberal Protestant. Lastly, I have suggested three ways in which critical
realism adds to the ongoing discussion between faith and science. First, a
postfoundational epistemoiogy is acknowledged. Second, both the theologian
and scientist seek to describe the same reality. And third, real emergent human
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persons are more than the sum of their material parts; thereby, metaphysical
inquiry is no longer divorced from the scientific agenda.
Despite the topics that have been covered thus far, many questions
remain for the critical realist theologian. Particularly, those questions may have
to do with interpretative methodology and sacred texts. In other words, how
does a critical realist responsibly read the Bible without falling victim to either
the fundamentalist's excessive literalism on the one hand or the liberal's radical
editing of the text on the other? Questions such as these drive our inquiry
forward.
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CHAPTER 3
Critical Realism and Reading the Bible
It is not an overstatement for me to communicate that at the moment I
am typing these words a battle is raging. It began on the battlefield of the
blogosphere then spilled over into the formal news media. It revolves around
the release of the book entitled Love Wins by the popular Grand Rapids pastor
Rob Bell. Of course, I should qualify this claim. The intensity of this battle varies
from person to person. Some have declared Bell's work as noxious heterodoxy,
bidding him a fond farewell from the rank and file of evangelicalism.i^^ Others
have embraced it wholeheartedly, and still others have found both positives and
negatives worthy of engagement. My purposes here are certainly not to address
the doctrinal issues brought to the fore by Love Wins. Rather, in this chapter I
intend to explore the framework of a critical realist hermeneutic. I will begin by
making a suggestion that I believe reveals what is at the root of the Love Wins
contention and many others like it that occur regularly outside the eye of the
media. It is my hope that this suggestion will serve as a launch point for asking
the inevitably difficult questions that ultimately lead to the realm of
119 Here I am alluding to Pastor John Piper's Twitter post that read, "Goodbye Rob Bell."
This was accompanied by a link to a scathing review of Bell's book.
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interpretative theory. Following that suggestion I will attempt a brief survey of
literary theory with an eye towards biblical interpretation. Lastly, I will suggest
how the tenets of critical realism are employed with respect to hermeneutics
thereby allowing a form of interpretative realism to remain plausible, resisting
the antifoundational extremity of an interpretative anti-realism. This endeavor
will serve the overall claim that critical realism provides a framework for
reading the Bible that meets the interpretative challenges of the postmodern
age. I begin by employing the controversy swarming around Bell's book as an
illustration ofwhat may be the actual root of the problem.
Hermeneutics as the Root of the Problem (or Solution)
Those who have been quick to rise up against the claims found in Love
Wins have centered their criticism, according to what I have read, on particular
doctrinal positions Bell has taken or implied. And, this may be well and good.
Yet, I do not believe that these critiques will sway many. Bell supporters will
remain. Bell scorners will also remain. Perhaps, both camps will only entrench
themselves deeper. Now, one may wonder why a spirited round of sophisticated
doctrinal debate may, in the end, only serve to harden the battle lines? I suggest
this is because these discussions do not address the root of the contention.
Lurking below the disagreement on doctrines concerning heaven and hell or
perseverance or justification lays the complex world of hermeneutics. This is the
realm of theological prolegomena, presuppositions, and method. And make no
mistake, it can be daunting for the theologian as well as the layperson.
Nevertheless, concerning the topic of method in theology, N.T. Wright remarks,
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"...ifwe do not explore presuppositional matters, we can expect endless and
fruitless debate. Those who are eager to get on with what they see as the real
business are welcome to. ..but they must not mind if by doing so they run into
puzzles at a later stage."i2o Interpretative questions, it seems, will remain as the
"elephant in the room" until they are addressed. Therefore, I have become
intrigued as I have followed the Love Wins discussion from the sidelines. This is
not because I desire to articulate a particular doctrinal stance, but because I have
not perceived any involved party to be asking questions directly related to
hermeneutics. This is unfortunate as questions aimed at interpretative
method could bring clarity to the dialogue. A lot of time could be saved and
issues could be addressed directly.
In light ofmy claim that hermeneutic assumptions constitute the bedrock
of doctrinal disputes, I suggest that asking the following types of questions may
lead to the consideration of issues prior to doctrine dealing with interpretation:
How is it that Christians, all reading the Bible, can come to varying conclusions
on certain topics? Is this appropriate or even logically possible? Further, how
can one judge as to whose reading of the Bible should stand and whose should
120 Wright, 31.
121 The lone exception that I have found may be the McLaren-Mohler exchange that has
been playing out in March of 2011. McLaren devotes approximately 25o/o of his essay to
discussing interpretative issues while Mohler give 34% of his article over to the topic. The
problem with both is that neither addresses the topic with the level of sophistication necessary
to bring clarity to the issues. Perhaps this is not a valid criticism since these are basically blog
posts. Yet, as long as the hard work of interpretation remains undone, I agree with N.T. Wright
�
no one should be surprised to run continually into puzzlement
McLaren's Article: http://www.huffingtonposLcom/brian-d-mclaren/will-love-wins-win-were-
e_b_839164.html
Mohler's Article: http://www.albertmohler.com/2011/03/23/a-theological-conversation-
worth-having-a-response-to-brian-mclaren/
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be thrown out? Is there one meaning embedded in the biblical text and can we
recover it? I find these questions to be fair yet difficult�of the type that have
indubitably vexed the theologian and layperson for millennia. Indeed, they are
the sort of questions that point to issues that are prior to the acts of reading and
applying the Bible.
Now before proceeding, I believe it is important to acknowledge the
following basic assumption: the descriptive task of evangelical biblical theology,
upon which subsequent systematic, practical, and historic theologies are
constructed, presupposes a hermeneutical methodology that cedes to the
interpreter the "rational capital" needed to create doctrinal propositions.122 in
other words, those engaging in evangelical biblical theology are doing so by
means of certain hermeneutical assumptions (among other base assumptions)
that allow or disallow for particular conclusions to be drawn from the biblical
text. Furthermore, it is not the concern of the evangelical engaging in biblical
theology to seek to validate the presuppositions of their discipline.^^s This does
not mean that those scholars engaging in biblical theology are unaware of the
issues surrounding hermeneutics, but it could mean that biblical theologians
may not be optimally situated to engage hermeneutical issues as they often lead
into the realm of philosophy. Yet, I believe this is a realm into which we must go.
122 See Larry R. Helyer, The Witness ofJesus, Paul, andJohn: An Exploration in Biblical
Theology (Downers Grove: I VP Academic, 2008) 19-31 for a discussion of the structure of
traditional evangelical theology and the place that biblical theology takes therein.
123 Ibid., 22.
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It seems, then, that the evangelical systematic theologian, given the
nature of his or her training, is better equipped for the task of considering
questions ofmethod. More specifically, the nature of the systematic theologian's
training is synchronic, seeking to correlate logically the data generated by the
exegesis of the biblical theologian with "reason, tradition (historical theology),
and experience, as well as the empirical and social sciences and liberal arts."i24
That is not to mention the apologetic task of systematic theology which would
naturally lead to engaging the presuppositions of one's own thought as well as
the thought of one's interlocutors. Solid exegesis produced by the enterprise of
evangelical biblical theology is vital. Just as vital, yet perhaps less appreciated, is
the task of articulating the methodology that undergirds the exegetical process.
This task falls to the systematic theologian.
So far, the division of labor between the biblical and systematic
theologian that I have described seems meet and proper. Yet the tendency
amongst evangelical theologians has been to marginalize questions of method. ^^s
That is, the task of theological hermeneutics, taken up by the systematic
theologian, has not been emphasized by evangelicals nearly to the degree that it
has amongst their mainline counterparts.126 This is not because evangelicals
lack a methodological approach, but rather it is a matter of an uncritical
incorporation ofmethodological presuppositions. Often these presuppositions
import a modernistic, foundationalist epistemoiogy that tends to reduce the
12* Ibid., 25.
125 See Grenz and Franke, 13-15 for a discussion on method in evangelical theology.
126 Ibid.
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Bible to a book of propositions that simply need organized rather than taking the
Bible as a living testimony of God's revelation of himself, needing careful,
contextual interpretation. Again, the evangelical biblical theologian is not
without a method. It is just that the modernistic undergirding, particularly the
epistemological assumptions, are flawed. And, inasmuch as the critical realist
takes a stand against reductionistic metaphysics, he or she also stands against a
reductionistic epistemoiogy. A foundationalist epistemoiogy in tandem with a
naive realism is, according to critical realism, reductionistic.
Given these comments on method and theology, I can now reaffirm my
point. Why is it that doctrinal disputes within evangelicalism, like the current
dispute surrounding Bell's book, tend to flare up, bringing more confusion than
clarity? I say it is because there exists underlying hermeneutical
presuppositions that are often uncritically assumed by evangelical biblical
theologians. Hermeneutics is the root of the solution. Biblical theologians, at
certain junctures, are obliged to defend their interpretation of the text against
criticism, or they are compelled to critique another position. This practice of
defense/criticism is certainly a proper activity for the biblical theologian; within
that dialectic good interpretations are sharpened and extended while bad
interpretations are abandoned. However, more often than not�especially
amongst evangelicals� the method that underlies the exegetical interpretation
of a text is not discussed. And, therein lies the problem, as 1 believe that it is only
at the level of interpretative methodology that certain questions about resultant
readings of particular biblical texts can be fully understood.
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What is needed, then, is the abihty to navigate the turbulent waters of
hermeneutics. More specifically what is needed is a critical realist evangelical
biblical theologian equipped�perhaps through the work of the systematic
theologian�to articulate the nuanced rhetoric of literary realism. This exegete
is then positioned to engage in fruitful, rather than fruitless dialogue with critics.
As we continue towards analyzing a critical realist hermeneutic, I next offer a
brief survey of literary theory and its impact on biblical hermeneutics.
Literary Theory and the Bible
Contemporary literary theory is an eclectic mix of various schools of
literary criticism. Since the 1888 death of Matthew Arnold, the English
Victorian-age critic, there has been no central voice to speak on behalf of the
discipline, nor one particular school dominating the theoretical landscape.127
Also, it is important to note that the current playing field of literary theory has
been greatly impacted by the fragmentary tendencies of poststructuralism.i^s
The interpretation of the biblical text has followed the same general pattern.
When considering the interpretation of the New Testament, for example, there
have been two major eras. The first was a shift during the Enlightenment to a
"...single preoccupation with historical method..." while the second is the
methodological pluralism that characterizes the late twentieth and now twenty-
127 Charles E. Bressler, Literary Criticism: An Introduction to Theory and Practice [Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007],
128 Poststructuralism includes the deconstructionism ofDerrida, v�^hich is aimed at
disassembling the binary relationships ofWestern philosophy, amongst other long-held
assumptions. See ibid., 116-128.
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first centuries.129 in other words, there was an era where one method was
dominant, but that era has given way to a plurahty ofmethodologies. In what
follows I will attempt to trace some of the key paradigms for interpreting the
Bible from the premodern to the postmodern eras.
In the premodern era, revelation and tradition ruled the day. In other
words, interpretative enigmas were solved by appealing to the church's accepted
reading of the biblical text. Religious leaders held absolute views of reality and
truth based on the inherent authority of text and tradition (including creedal
confessions). This did not mean that there was a shortage of creativity when it
came to the premodern engagement of the biblical text. For instance, the early
Church Fathers borrowed from their Greek counterparts the method of
allegory.130 7^15 method was often overdone as too much symbolic meaning was
attributed to the text, yet the Fathers maintained that reality stood behind the
text as it was a faithful record of God's action in history.i^i
The watershed moment in the premodern era was the Reformation.
Particularly, for our purposes, the method of reading Scripture employed by
Martin Luther is instructive. Luther held that there is both an outer and inner
clarity ofScripture.^^z "jhe 'outer clarity' means the New Testament teaching
about jesus Christ is clear enough for anyone to understand, and the subjective
Anthony C. Thiseiton, "New Testament Interpretation in Historical Perspective," in
joel B. Green, ed., Hearing the New Testament: Strategiesfor Interpretation [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995], 10.
130 Laurence W. Wood, Theology as History and Hermeneutics [Lexington: Emeth Press,
2004) 106.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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illumination of the Holy Spirit provides an 'inner clarity' of its truthfulness."i33
Subsequently, a movement emerged known as High Lutheran Orthodoxy. High
Lutheran Orthodoxy emphasized Luther's concept of outer clarity thereby
setting up an intellectualist gauntlet to be overcome before one could arrive at a
right understanding of the Bible.i^^ in turn, a counter-movement developed
known as Pietism. Pietists resisted the Lutheran Orthodox emphasis on the
outer clarity ofScripture by seeking to establish and elevate the inner clarity and
the role of the Holy Spirit in interpretation.i^^
Reformation thought, and the dialectic of Lutheran Orthodoxy and
Pietism effectively functioned as the impetus for transitioning to a new
paradigm�modernity. Vanhoozer refers to modernity as the "Age of the Author"
because there was much interest in unearthing the intentions of the authors of
texts.136 The high point ofmodernity is found in 18* century Enlightenment
thought, yet the morning star of the period is often considered to be the French-
born philosopher Rene Descartes (1598-1650). Descartes began questioning the
authoritarian assumptions of the premodern era. He set the stage for
autonomous reason to usurp traditionalist (i.e. premodern) readings of the text.
In his 1637 essay entitled Discourse on Method, Descartes began the
development of what would later become known as modern foundationalism.i37
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Vanhoozer, 25.
137 Wood, 1.
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He sought a rational foundation for belief in God free from revelation and
traditionalism.
In the wake of Descartes and in the midst of the shifting intellectual
landscape that was the advent ofmodernity, the thought of Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was born. Schleiermacher would become known
as the father of modern theology and is noted as giving the quintessential
account ofmodernistic, author-centered hermeneutics.^^s His thesis was quite
bold as he ultimately claimed that the interpreter could connect with the
consciousness of the author; thus, the interpreter was able to understand the
meaning of a text better than the text's author.i39 Schleiermacher thought this
was possible due to the ability of human beings to understand common
experiences by means of empathy.^'^^o This psychological interpretative method
"...means that one must re-enact the selfhood of the author to gain an
understanding of the text."i'^i Ironically, the psychological hermeneutic of
Schleiermacher derived via the subjective, psychological connection between
interpreter and author was considered to be the route to gaining an objective
understanding of the meaning of a text. The author's reporting of objective
history began to be superseded in the modern period by the "objective" data
generated by Schleiermacher's psychological hermeneutic.1^2 xhe sola scriptura
138 Vanhoozer, 25
139 Ibid.
110 Wood, 109.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
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principle of the Reformation had been rejected as religious experience was taken
as being prior to Scripture.i^^
Building on the thought of Schleiermacher, philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey
[1833-1911) extended the modernist predilection toward the central challenge
of theology as being the demonstration of a cogent epistemology.i'^'^ If textual
understanding for Schleiermacher came through the psychological connection of
author and interpreter, historical understanding for Dilthey was ascertained in a
similar fashion. Dilthey drew a distinction between "...the epistemoiogy of the
natural sciences and the epistemoiogy of the human sciences.''^'^^ short,
attempting to gain knowledge of the natural world, which is the undertaking of
the natural sciences, will never yield true knowledge as human perception of the
natural world is always veiled. However, humans are capable of gaining true
knowledge of human action and of the human mind.^''^^ Further, history is
created by the human mind, and since the human mind can be known, then
history, in this qualified sense, can be known. So, historical understanding on
Dilthey's method becomes an internal, subjective matter just as textual
understanding does for Schleiermacher.
There are certainly more modern interpreters that could be considered,
but what becomes clear in this period is that history is no longer a reliable
witness of the events of the past. Modern philosophy had produced a situation
143 Wood, 108.
144 Ibid., 113.
145 Ibid., 110.
146 Ibid.
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in which fact was divorced from value, subject separated from object. This was
epitomized in the existential theology of Rudolph Bultmann whereby he
separated the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith. i'^^ We also see signs of the
binary nature of modern thought when we contrast the waxing of a scientific
epistemoiogy that considers the scientific method to be the best avenue for
knowing with the waning ofmetaphysical realism and ideas like the eternal soul
and an omnipotent, omniscient God. Yet, one major shift in human thought
remains. Postmodernism would call Enlightenment thought into question on
many fronts.
There are many attempts made at describing when the shift to a
postmodern outlook took place. Some say the death of Nietzsche marks the end
of the modern era. Others note the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the
attendant failure ofMarxism as the proper time. Still others mark a specific
meeting of particular architects, noting the date and time, as the proper
harbinger of the new age. No matter when one marks the advent of
postmodernism, there is little doubt that a shift in thinking has occurred. For
our purposes noting the expansion of literary theory and hermeneutics will be
useful as we consider postmodernism.
In the 19* century, hermeneutics leapt from the science of interpreting
texts to the art of interpreting life.i'^s x^at is, thinkers began to note the
subjective, interpretative elements of all human inquiry. Thus when Jacques
Laurence W. Wood, God and History: The Dialectical Tension ofFaith and History in
Modern Thought (Lexington: Emeth, 2005), 205-230.
148 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 20.
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Derrida uttered his famous saying, "There is nothing outside of the text," a
hermeneutics of hfe was imphed.i-^^ xhis can be seen in the development of
literary theory (or just theory) as well. As noted, the contemporary landscape of
theory is highly populated with some methods standing in stark contrast to
others. Furthermore, theorists today are not only critiquing texts, but rather it is
open season for the critique of everything.
Jonathan Culler, long-time professor of English at Cornell University,
makes use of the American pragmatist Richard Rorty's insights when explaining
the development of theory. Culler aims to show that beginning in the 19*
century a distinct genre ofwriting that would become known as theory began to
develop.150 This genre is thoroughly interdisciplinary including "works of
anthropology, art history, film studies, gender studies, linguistics, philosophy,
political theory, psychoanalysis, science studies, social and intellectual history
and sociology."i5i "Theory in this sense is not a set of methods for literary study
but an unbounded group ofwritings about everything under the sun, from the
most technical problems of academic philosophy to the changing ways in which
people have talked and thought about the human body."!" Understanding
Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology (Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1997), 158.
150 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A BriefInsight (New York: Sterling, 1997), 3-5.
151 Ibid., 4. To this list it seems appropriate to add the discipline of theology. In a sense,
when theologians seek to develop a theology ofwork, or language, or culture, etc. they are
engaging in a project that is similar to the critical enterprise of the theorist Yet, there are
certainly significant differences as well. Theologians would likely have a tendency to not only
deconstruct, but to construct where the theorist may leave off after the deconstructive work is
done.
152 Ibid., 4.
69
theory in this way allows one to see how the work of particular thinkers may
grow and be used beyond the discipline for which it was written.
Take the work of LudwigWittgenstein (1889-1951) as an example.
Through his development of the idea that we play "language games" as the
principles of interpretation vary depending on factors like culture, gender, socio
economics, etc., the laterWittgenstein, "...became a critic of modern
perspectives. ..and may be viewed as a forerunner of postmodern anxiety."^^^
The general lesson here is that the contemporary, postmodern realm of theory is
not geared to provide "harmonious solutions" to our interpretative questions.i^'^
Once one theoretical option is articulated six more may possibly step in to deride
the original. Welcome to the postmodern conundrum.
Now, the question becomes, what impact has the postmodern turn had on
biblical interpretation. From the standpoint of literary critical methodology�
the tools of inquiry for the literary theorist�the options are manifold.^ss j^sj; ^
casual glance at the table of contents of any textbook concerned with literary
theory or criticism will reveal many standard theoretical options like Russian
formalism, new criticism, structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstruction,
feminist theory, Marxism, queer theory, and more. Evangelical biblical
interpreters have worked to deflect negative, degenerate attacks produced by
some critical methods, but have also found welcome insights via others.
153 Donald K McKim, "Biblical Interpretations in Europe in the Twentieth Century," in
Donald K. McKim, ed., Dictionary ofMajor Biblical Interpreters (Downers Grove: IVP Academic,
2007) 68-69. Emphasis mine.
154 Culler, 163.
155 See Bressler, pp. 6-7 for a concise explanation of the relationship between literary
criticism and literary theory.
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Nevertheless, the climate produced by the iconoclasms of postmodern theory
affords the evangelical biblical interpreter a unique opportunity. In many ways,
the interpretative slate has been wiped clean. The possibility of garnering
helpful insight from the premodern and modern eras to aid in faithfully reading
the Bible is a reality. Only, as we make this interpretative exodus into the
postmodern age, and we gather the interpretative "Egyptian gold" of bygone
eras, we must be sure that it is faithfully put to use once we arrive.
Critical Realism and Hermeneutics
I return in this last section to consider critical realism more directly.
Here I employ as guides the writings of both Kevin Vanhoozer and N.T. Wright.
Both assume the central tenets of critical realism. Vanhoozer is a systematic
theologian whose seminal work. Is There a Meaning in This Text? wiW be
consulted. Wright is probably best described as a historical theologian although
his work is quite sweeping. His ability to converse with biblical theology and
systematics is both impressive and needed in the evangelical community. His
multi-volume Christian Origins and the Question ofGod series is still in process.
In the first installment of that series. The New Testament and the People ofGod,
Wright devotes the second section to questions of theological method. The
choice to consult Vanhoozer and Wright underscores my previous call for an
evangelical critical realist approach to biblical theology that is sensitive to the
contention surrounding literary realism.
Indeed, the claim that there is a mind-independent or text-independent
reality in existence is perhaps the most significant dividing line in hermeneutics.
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Those advocating for that position may occupy a range subsequent positions. To
one extreme are what Vanhoozer calls the "cognitive zealots."i56 They typically
believe that there is one correct interpretation of a given text and that
interpretation is found by committing to the hard interpretative work necessary
to do the job. The underlying epistemoiogy, which is rarely acknowledged, is a
form of foundationalism. New Criticism, which developed in the first two-thirds
of the 20* century, is a good example of this position. Proponents of this literary
theory put forth the notion that, by following the proper formula of analysis, the
correct meaning of a text can be determined. New Critics, as adherents are
called, find this procedure attractive, viewing the methodology as a universal key
for unlocking objective meaning, using (for the most part) the text itself, so long
as the proper procedures are followed.^^^
On the other end of the spectrum reside the "Cognitive Atheists."i5s This
is a position of extreme skepticism where it is believed that there is simply not
enough evidence to determine a correct interpretation. Whereas the New Critic
finds meaning embedded within the text, the poststructuralist, relying on
deconstruction theory, believes that the text is actually running an interference
pattern thus misconstruing attempts at meaning.^^g jhe result is an
antifoundationalist form of interpretative nihilism.
156 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 294.
157 Bressler, 55.
158 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 294.
159 Bressler, 117.
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Between these two poles stand the "Critical Believers."i^o One particular
stance taken by the Critical Believer Vanhoozer calls Hermeneutic Inclusivism.^^'^
For them, the text presents itself to the reader as having a finite number of
correct readings. "There are textual constraints as well as textual openings for
the reader."i62 yhis is a text-based approach to determining meaning that is
capable of ruling out many interpretations but also capable of approving a
plurality of methods that arrive at different meanings. This is where critical
realism fits in.^^s is it possible to believe in a single correct interpretation of a
text without claiming to have absolute knowledge of it? The critical realist says
yes. Recall the epistemological stance of critical realism is postfoundational. Of
course, this does not mean that the critical realist joins in the antifoundational
beliefs of the interpretative non-realist. Just because one cannot have complete
knowledge of something does not necessitate that one retreat to the belief that
no knowledge is possible. Ironically, the one who retreats to the
antifoundational position, it seems, still is influenced by the desire to have
absolute knowledge. Since they cannot have all of it, they will have none of it.
What we are claiming thus far is that the critical realist finds it rational to
believe in determinate meaning in the face of interpretative disagreement.i64
The notion of determinate meaning, however, is not taken for granted by
Vanhoozer. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the idea that a text has a
160 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 294.
161 Ibid., 294-295.
162 Ibid., 295.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., 292-303. The pages cited here are where Vanhoozer answers to the affirmative
that determinate meaning can be appealed to in the face of interpretative disagreement
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determinate meaning comes by way of the interpretative anti-reahsm of Stanley
Fish.165
Fish locates meaning and truth in the interpretative community. In other
words, those communities reading texts are doing so within a context that is
temporal, social, cultural, economic, etal. The "correct" interpretation for Fish is
then the one that a particular interpretative community, at that moment in time,
adheres to. He states that, "To someone who believes in determinate meaning,
disagreement can only be a theological error."i66 pish goes on to comment
parenthetically that "original sin would seem to be the only relevant model" for
accounting for how and why interpretations conflict.i^? He does not seek to
discredit a model of determinate meaning that accepts original sin. Vanhoozer
realizes this and employs Plantinga's work to counter Fishi^s
Briefly, Vanhoozer, following Plantinga, argues that there is a difference
between the normative conditions under which a community of readers
determines meaning and the proper conditions under which meaning is
ascertained. Now for Fish, authority is determined by the "normal" procedures
and "normal" conditions of the community. Yet, "normal" does not equal
"proper." The cognitive effects of original sin skew the interpretative process of
properly determining meaning. Therefore, a determinate meaning can be said to
See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?: TheAuthority ofInterpretative
Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980} for his argument w^hich I will
only briefly summarize in what follows.
166 Ibid., 338.
167 Ibid.
168 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 298-299. The following paragraph is a
summary of the argument of these pages.
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exist, but apprehending that meaning will always be inhibited by the sin
problem. That is, there is an interpretative reality, but it cannot be accessed in
full; critical realism is comfortable with this claim.
At this point, I turn to incorporate some insight from Wright. Part of the
critique of the modern world by postmodernism is the assertion that there is no
such thing as an authoritative framing story available to anyone. This, of course,
is in line with Fish's view. This assumes an anti-realism that relegates truth and
meaning to the local narrative. But what happens when local narratives that are
mutually exclusive collide? This is a common question when considering world
religions, but what about applying it to international politics. Who is to say that
one nation-state's foreign or domestic policies are better than any other? I
submit that it is difficult to make a value judgment that is consistent with one's
convictions if they locate truth and meaning within the local interpretative
community. Yet, Wright makes much of local communities telling their stories
and those stories having a normative function. Is this able to be incorporated
with Vanhoozer's critique of Fish and critical realism? I believe it is.
First, Wright always assumes reality. He takes it as the given measuring
stick for each local community. For the Christian this assumption of reality
means nothing less than the acknowledgement that God's self-revelation has
produced a narrative which he or she is to both learn and live. Further, Wright
acknowledges that a critical realist epistemoiogy is from the outset a
contextualized epistemoiogy. Story-telling humans tell their stories within a
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story-laden world. These stories, contra Fish but in agreement with
Vanhoozer, all make claims about reality. Critical reflection upon the stories we
tell, coupled with the humble belief that our claims about reality may be
mistaken, will yield a further narrative�"alternative ways of speaking truly
about the world" will emerge.i^�
The sun is barley rising on this discussion of critical realism and
hermeneutics. For example, we did not broach the subject of speech-act theory
that looms large in Vanhoozer's work. Also, we did not explore further the idea
of Hermeneutical Inclusivism which would ultimately lead to an analysis of Paul
Ricoeur's hermeneutic of suspicion and retrieval. Both would take us too far
afield.
Yet, in closing I wish to make one last point. That is, ultimately the critical
realist seeks to emphasize ontology (or metaphysics) over epistemoiogy. This
makes way for the sort of realist claims that anchor a critical realist hermeneutic.
But, without the articulation of a nuanced epistemoiogy, an undertaking that I
believe needs to be taken seriously by evangelical theologians,i^i the case for
ontology cannot be made. This proves difficult since, even ifmost evangelical
theologians accept the demise of foundationalist epistemologies, the step into
the postfoundational era has not bee a uniform one. In other words, there may
be broad based agreement on postfoundational epistemoiogy, but does that then
Wright, 44.
170 Ibid.
171 What I mean by "take seriously" is that there is a need for creative explanation of the
chastened and nuanced epistemoiogy held by the critical realist for the laity of the church.
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mean that a coherentist framework is the only option? Further, what of the
metaphysical landscape? Postmodern evangelicals desire to move beyond
metaphysics while critical realists seek to describe reality with a great degree of
clarity. Wright captures the spirit of our current era within some of his own
concluding remarks: "If someone asks what knock-down arguments I can
produce for showing that this theory [critical realist epistemoiogy] about how
humans know things is in fact true, it would obviously be self-contradictory to
reply in essentially empiricist terms. The only appropriate argument is the
regular one about puddings and eating.''^^^ go, I say let us taste and see that it is
good.
Coda
In this chapter I have attempted to capture the essentials of a critical
realist hermeneutic. It has already been established in my argument that one of
the advantages of adopting critical realism is that it creates the possibility of a
hermeneutic that is postfoundational in its epistemoiogy and fully open to a
metaphysic that points beyond the empirical world. Another way of stating this
claim is that the subject/object distinction of modern theology is cautiously
repaired by critical realism. I began this chapter by suggesting that at the root of
many doctrinal disputes, such as the current one swirling around Bell's book
Love Wins, is really the question of hermeneutics. Also, I explained the key
assumption that underlying biblical theology is an interpretative methodology
Ibid., 45. Clearly, one can see with Wright's words the ease with which one can speak
with the terminology of coherentism, but all the while not let go ofmetaphysics, nor desire to
somehow go beyond metaphysics as the postmodern theologian does.
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that, within evangehcaHsm, sometimes assumes the flawed propositions of
foundationahsm. I went on to assert that what is needed is a critical realist
evangelical biblical theologian equipped�perhaps through the work of the
systematic theologian�to articulate the nuanced rhetoric of literary (or
interpretative) realism.
After that, I gave a brief summary of literary theory and biblical
interpretation noting that the premodern era was characterized by an appeal to
the dual authorities of text and tradition. The modern era was characterized by
the quest for a rational foundation for belief. The result was the grounding of
theology in the existential self as the selfwas thought to be all that could be
known. The knowing subject was thereby divorced from the object of
observation rendering history a useless witness to the revelation of God found in
the Bible. The postmodern era, with the turn toward hermeneutics and literary
theory, was explained as a time of critique of modernism bringing both
challenges and welcome insight to theology.
Lastly, following Vanhoozer and Wright, I attempted to show how critical
realism is able to negotiate the questions presented by postmodernism without
falling into the trap of a thoroughgoing relativism. This was done by illustrating
how Vanhoozer and Wright can both respond to Fish by employing a nuanced
postfoundational epistemoiogy, which clears the way for their insistence upon
interpretative realism.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have been exploring the usefulness of critical realism for
the evangelical theologian who is concerned with the content of classical
Christianity. My claim has been that critical realism provides a cogent
philosophical system for entering into profitable dialogue with postmodern
theology and the sciences. I am in agreement with Wright who says, "such a
model. ..has a lot ofmileage.''^^^
One heading on which many of those miles could be logged is that of
theological method. Evangelicals are being, and will continue to be well served
by wrestling with questions directed at method raised by critical realism.
Further research should most certainly include projects in which biblical
1" Wright, 45.
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theologians and systematic theologians consider the philosophical assumptions
underneath their work. This would particularly include engaging interpretative
theory. As mentioned, the thought of Paul Ricoeur is significant in this area. His,
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning is comprised of four
lectures given at Texas Christian University in which the central problem at
stake is that of language as a wor/f.i^'^ I suggest Ricoeur as both a significant and
recent voice in hermeneutics and also as a wonderful vehicle to go further and
deeper into the discussion.
1 also wish to suggest, as a matter of both further research and practical
application, that the essence of a postfoundational epistemoiogy and the
implications of such a position need packaged both for the layperson in the
church and the theologian who may find such conjectures ostensibly insipid, or
worse, hostile. I explained early on that the postmodern theologian and the
critical realist both reject foundationalism. Indeed, today it is difficult to find
anyone defending a foundationalist epistemoiogy. Also, a postfoundational
epistemoiogy acts as a critical element in the amalgam that is the antidote to a
scientific or materialistic metaphysic. The avenues for research are manifold,
but all need to involve knowledge and truth as being mediated and
transpositional. Then, the implications for adopting such views should be
explored. Practically, for church laity, this would involve discussions of how to
deal with conflicting doctrinal positions in an irenic manner. Grasping the claim
Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976].
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that the absence ofan absolute level ofknowledge does not preclude the gaining of
a significant level ofknowledge would be at the heart of such an endeavor. The
challenge, of course, is in making epistemoiogy both understandable and
attractive to the layperson.
Along a different horizon, the evangelical critical realist theologian is
positioned to have significant dialogue with his or her counterparts in the
sciences. A danger, or at least an apprehension, inherent in this dialogue has
centered on the question ofwhat to do when scientific claims and doctrinal
claims seemingly clash. Should science dictate the terms of reformulating
doctrinal positions? That is where Plantinga's argument, as previously
explained, is a great aid. If it can be cogently argued, as I believe Plantinga has,
that science and theology are not mortal enemies, but rather both describing the
same reality, then the possibility of carefully crafted, interdisciplinary dialogue
does indeed exist. And this possibility is exciting, yet the challenge of convincing
a large portion of the evangelical world to move out of the confrontational model
of engaging the sciences is the first order of business.
Finally, critical realism as a philosophical system adopted by evangelical
theologians concerned with maintaining the doctrinal positions of classical
Christianity does have, as it should, a voice in the contemporary theological
conversation. While I do believe that some form of a critical realist paradigm for
doing Christian theology will ultimately become normative over and against
postmodern ideas, I do welcome the continued dialogue. How could I not? The
critical realist would not want it any other way.
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